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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the influence that juvenile offenders serving time in the same 
correctional facility have on each other’s subsequent criminal behavior.  The analysis is 
based on data on over 8,000 individuals serving time in 169 juvenile correctional 
facilities during a two-year period in Florida.  These data provide a complete record of 
past crimes, facility assignments, and arrests and adjudications in the year following 
release for each individual.  To control for the non-random assignment to facilities, we 
include facility fixed effects, thereby estimating peer effects using only within-facility 
variation over time.  We find strong evidence of peer effects for various categories of 
theft, burglary, and felony drug and weapon crimes; the influence of peers primarily 
affects individuals who already have some experience in a particular crime category.  We 
also find evidence that peer effects are stronger in smaller facilities and that the 
predominant types of peer effects differ in residential versus non-residential facilities; 
effects in the latter are consistent with network formation among youth serving time close 
to home.   
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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the influence that juvenile offenders serving time in the same correctional 
facility have on each other’s subsequent criminal behavior.  The analysis is based on data on over 
8,000 individuals serving time in 169 juvenile correctional facilities during a two-year period in 
Florida.  These data provide a complete record of past crimes, facility assignments, and arrests 
and adjudications in the year following release for each individual.  To control for the non-
random assignment to facilities, we include facility fixed effects, thereby estimating peer effects 
using only within-facility variation over time.  We find strong evidence of peer effects for various 
categories of theft, burglary, and felony drug and weapon crimes; the influence of peers primarily 
affects individuals who already have some experience in a particular crime category.  We also 
find evidence that peer effects are stronger in smaller facilities and that the predominant types of 
peer effects differ in residential versus non-residential facilities; effects in the latter are consistent 
with network formation among youth serving time close to home.   
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I. Introduction 
Juvenile crime is a serious problem in modern American society.  In 2000, law 
enforcement agencies throughout the United States made approximately 2.4 million arrests of 
juveniles under the age of eighteen, or approximately one arrest for every 10 individuals between 
the ages of thirteen and eighteen  (FBI, 2001; Puzzanchera et al., 2002).  More than 500,000 of 
these arrests were for property crimes; more than 200,000 were for drug-related violations; and 
almost 100,000 were for violent crimes (FBI, 2001).  On any given day in 1999, over 100,000 
juvenile offenders were being held in residential placement (Sickmund, 2002).  Concerned with 
the magnitude of these statistics, a number of researchers have attempted to identify the factors 
that influence juvenile crime.  In particular, studies have often focused on factors illuminated in 
Becker’s economic model of crime (1968), such as the deterrent effect of sanctions, the 
probability of getting caught, and legitimate sources of income.1  Few papers, however, have 
considered how the characteristics and behavior of an individual’s peers affect his or her 
propensity to engage in criminal activity.  The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical 
evidence on such peer effects in juvenile crime.  We do so by examining them in a setting where 
interactions among individuals with criminal experience are likely to be particularly intense: 
juvenile correctional facilities.  
 Criminal behavior may be affected by peer effects that occur in the family, in school, on 
the street corner, in a gang, in the neighborhood, or in prison.  Such peer effects may arise from 
any number of underlying mechanisms related to the social interactions between two individuals 
or a group of individuals; it is helpful for interpreting the results of our analysis to enumerate 
some of these mechanisms here.2  We focus on potential mechanisms related to the criminal 
experience of an individual’s peers, grouping these mechanisms into three broad categories: (i) 
those related to a social stigma, (ii) those related to the reinforcement of addictive behavior, and 
(iii) those related to information dispersion and network formation.  Social stigma refers to the 
                                                 
1 For example, Levitt (1998) shows that harsher punishments for juveniles are strongly associated with 
lower rates of juvenile offending for both violent crimes and property crimes.  Grogger (1998) finds a 
negative relationship between market wages and youth crime.  Mocan and Rees (1999) study the impact of 
juvenile arrest rates, unemployment, and family structure  on the propensity of juveniles to commit both 
violent crimes and property crimes. 
2 The theoretical literature in sociology and, more recently, in economics describes many of the potential 
channels through which social interactions may work.  Sutherland (1939) highlights learning from peers, in 
the form of information, skill acquisition, and behavioral norms; this mechanism is also incorporated into 
the models of Sah (1991) and Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2003).  Ethnographic studies by Anderson 
(1990, 1999) and the theoretical model of Silverman (2002) describe social interactions that arise through 
reputational effects.  Criminal gangs and other crime networks may also have productive in addition to 
learning effects (Sarnecki, 2001; Warr, 2002). 
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impact that an individual’s peers have on behavior related to perceived pressures, social norms, 
and other similar social influences.  The standard hypothesis in this case is that when an 
individual is exposed to peers who regard criminal activity in a negative way, the individual is 
less likely to participate in such behavior.  Similarly, exposure to peers with a greater intensity of 
criminal experience can reduce or reverse this stigma, thereby increasing the propensity of the 
individual to participate in criminal activity.  Second, especially in the case of drug crimes, 
addiction or habit-formation may play a significant role in an individual’s propensity to recidivate 
with such a crime.  Peer interactions would be important in this case if exposure to peers with 
similar habits or addictions reinforces an individual’s own addiction.     
The third mechanism listed above relates to the dissemination of crime-related 
information through peer interactions, which we label social learning, and the development of 
criminal networks.3  Social learning may occur because individuals use the experiences of their 
peers to update their beliefs concerning the expected benefits or punishments of committing 
particular crimes, making individuals more or less likely to commit these crimes.  Alternatively, 
social learning may take the form of the acquisition of crime-specific skills and knowledge, such 
as how to steal a car, how to disconnect a burglary alarm, or how to avoid being caught by the 
police.  In this case, interactions with individuals who have experience committing a particular 
type of crime may allow an individual to acquire this knowledge more easily, thereby leading to 
increased activity in the corresponding crime category. Finally, access to individuals with 
experience in a given criminal activity might assist in the formation or expansion of an 
individual’s criminal network.  Networking of this sort is especially important in more 
complicated criminal activities such as those related to auto theft or illegal drugs, which require a 
great deal of coordination among manufacturers, distributors, sellers, and users. 
While distinguishing the existence and magnitude of peer effects or social interactions 
has been the focus of a large body of recent empirical research in economics,4,5 empirical work 
                                                 
3 There is a small but growing body of research in economics on social learning and network formation, 
including Besley and Case (1994), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Munshi (1999), and Conley and Udry 
(2002).   
4 The goal of much of the recent literature in economics has been to deal explicitly with the three traditional 
difficulties involved in the estimation of social interactions in linear models: the simultaneity (reflection) 
problem, the non-random selection of individuals into peer groups, and the presence of correlated 
unobservable factors that affect the behavior or outcomes of everyone in a peer group.  Moffitt (2001) 
provides an excellent overview of these difficulties.  See Brock and Durlauf (2001) for a discussion of 
these issues in a nonlinear context.  
5 A great deal of recent work in the economics of education literature, in particular, has explicitly attempted 
to deal with the non-random selection of individuals into schools and classrooms.  See, for example, Evans, 
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exploring the importance of social interactions in criminal behavior has been relatively limited.  
The few papers that attempt to provide direct evidence of social interactions are generally subject 
to serious concerns regarding the non-random selection or assignment of an individual’s peers.6  
Indirect evidence of social interactions is provided by Sah (1991) and Glaeser, Sacerdote, and 
Scheinkman (1996); these authors conclude that social interactions must play an important role in 
criminal behavior as crime exhibits variation across time and space that is difficult to explain with 
observable differences in the economic and social environment.7  Additionally, Jacob and 
Lefgren’s (2003) finding, that school attendance increases the amount of violent crimes but 
decreases the amount of property crimes, underscores the role played by social interactions in 
explaining violent crimes.  
In light of the paucity of credible direct evidence to date, the central goal of this paper is 
to estimate the effects of peer characteristics on criminal behavior in a manner that deals directly 
with the non-random assignment of individuals to correctional facilities and, consequently, to 
their peers.  Specifically, we examine whether the behavior of a juvenile offender after being 
released from a correctional facility is influenced by the characteristics of individuals with whom 
he concurrently served time in that facility.  The analysis is based on data on over 8,000 
individuals serving time in 169 juvenile correctional facilities during a two-year period in Florida.  
These data provide a complete record of past crimes, facility assignments, and arrests and 
adjudications in the year following release for each individual.   
Our empirical analysis consists of a series of regressions that relate recidivism in each of 
a number of crime categories to individual demographic and criminal history characteristics, peer 
demographic and criminal history characteristics, and interactions between these individual and 
peer characteristics.  To control for the non-random assignment of juveniles to facilities, we 
                                                                                                                                                 
Oates, and Schwab (1992); Hanushek et al. (2000); Hoxby (2000); Sacerdote (2000); Boozer and Cacciola 
(2001); and Angrist and Lang (2002). 
6 Reiss (1988) and Warr (1996) provide a summary of sociological research based on co-offender surveys, 
which universally do not control for the non-random selection of peers as well as other endogeneity issues.  
Thornberry et al. (1993, 2003) provide evidence that criminal behavior increases once individuals become 
members of gangs, but no attempt is made to control for the non-random timing of the decision to join a 
gang.  More recently, Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield (2001) use the Moving to Opportunity experiment 
to study the effects of neighborhoods on criminal behavior.  They find that a shift to a wealthier 
neighborhood decreases violent while increasing property crimes, but it remains unclear whether their 
results are driven by changes in private incentives or social interactions.  Gaviria and Raphael (2001) find 
strong evidence of peer-group effects in the crime-related behaviors of drug use, alcohol drinking, and 
cigarette smoking for a sample of high school students.  But there is mixed evidence on the extent to which 
endogenous sorting across schools inflates their peer effects measures.  
7 Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert (2001) are able to explain much of the aggregate dynamic variation in 
crime over the past quarter-century without relying explicitly on social interactions. 
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include facility fixed effects in these regressions.  This ensures that the impact of peers on 
recidivism is identified using only the variation in the length of time that any two individuals 
serving a sentence in the same facility happen to overlap.   
Relative to other settings where the estimation of social interactions has proven more 
difficult, this empirical strategy exploits a unique feature of correctional facilities—namely, that 
the peer group is constantly evolving over time with the admittance and release of individuals as 
their sentences begin and expire.8  As long as the date at which a given individual is assigned to a 
facility within the two-year sample period is random with respect to the peers in the facility at 
that time, this empirical strategy properly controls for the non-random assignment of individuals 
to facilities.  We provide a number of different tests of this central identifying assumption, 
demonstrating among other things that the within-facility variation in peer characteristics is 
orthogonal to all observable individual characteristics.9 
  We find strong evidence of the existence of peer effects in juvenile correctional facilities.  
In most instances, these peer effects have a reinforcing nature, whereby exposure to peers with a 
history of committing a particular crime increases the probability that an individual who has 
already committed the same type of crime recidivates with that crime.  When using the entire 
sample, this form of a reinforcing peer effect is positive and significant for the cases of burglary, 
petty larceny, misdemeanor drug offenses, and felony sex offenses.  However, when using the 
sample of relatively small facilities, where peer interactions are presumably measured more 
precisely, this reinforcing peer effect is also positive and significant for robbery and felony drug 
offenses.  In contrast, we find no evidence that exposure to peers with particular criminal histories 
increases an individual’s propensity to recidivate in a crime category in which the individual has 
no prior experience; in our main specifications, the corresponding coefficient is never positive 
and significant and is in fact negative and significant for robbery and petty larceny.  In addition, 
we find evidence of different types of peer effects in non-residential versus residential facilities.  
Specifically, there is a strong reinforcing peer effect for the crimes of auto theft, robbery, and 
                                                 
8 Recent research in other settings has generally relied on particular randomizing events, such as the 
random assignment of roommates (Sacerdote, 2000) or randomization derived from social experiments 
such as the Moving to Opportunity experiment in Boston (Katz, Kling, and Leibman, 2001) or the STAR 
experiment in Tennessee schools (Boozer and Cacciola, 2001).  Relying on such events or experiments, 
however, can severely limit the settings where peer effects can be studied and the generalizability of the 
findings.  
9 In the context of juvenile correctional facilities, the simultaneity problem (first described by Manski 
(1993)) is that the influence of peer characteristics, such as the intensity of peer criminal history, cannot be 
distinguished from the influence of future peer behavior.  Because it is impossible to distinguish these types 
of peer effects without strong a priori functional form assumptions, we simply assume that peer effects 
operate through the influence of peer characteristics rather than subsequent peer behavior.   
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felony drug offenses in non-residential facilities; the nature of these crimes is consistent with 
important network effects in non-residential facilities, which tend to be very close to the 
residential locations of those assigned to these facilities..    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the data.  
Section III outlines our basic empirical methodology, identification strategy, and measurement 
issues.  Section IV presents the main results, and Section V examines a series of policy issues 
related to these results.  Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Data and Juvenile Corrections in Florida 
The primary data source for this study is the internal database that the Florida Department 
of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) maintains for juvenile offenders under its care.  We were granted access 
to the DJJ’s records on all youths released from a Florida-based juvenile correctional facility 
between July 1, 1997 and June 30, 1999.  These data provide complete histories of the experience 
of each individual in the Florida juvenile justice system, including records of all past arrests, 
adjudications,10 sentences, and facility assignments.  The data also provide some basic socio-
demographic information, such as date of birth, race, and zip code of residence at the time of the 
individual’s most recent assignment to a facility.  16,164 youths are included in the full sample.  
For each individual in the initial sample, the data detail whether or not the individual 
recidivates within the first year following release.  The type of crime committed upon 
recidivating, however, is only available if the individual is younger than age eighteen at the date 
of re-arrest and, thus, still a juvenile in the Florida system.  In analyzing post-release criminal 
behavior, we therefore eliminate from the sample all individuals who are older than age seventeen 
when released; for all individuals remaining in the sample, we observe if the individual 
recidivates and (if so) the details of the recidivism offense.  While the initial sample contains 
records for 16,164 individuals, only 9,382 of these individuals remained juveniles for at least one 
year after release.  For an additional 982 of these individuals, the data are missing facility 
assignment and, finally, for an additional 184 individuals, the data are missing admit/release date 
information.  Thus, the primary sample used in our analysis contains 8,216 juveniles.  However, 
data for the full set of individuals for whom facility assignment and admit/release date 
information is available are used in constructing the measures of peer characteristics used in the 
analysis.   
                                                 
10 An adjudication, in the vernacular of the juvenile justice system, is analogous to a conviction in the adult 
system.  
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The sample includes not only detailed information on recidivism behavior, but also data 
on the youths’ correctional facility assignments, criminal histories, personal characteristics, and 
home neighborhoods.  Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.  Measures of overall 
recidivism can be constructed on the basis of either a subsequent adjudication (conviction) or a 
subsequent criminal charge.  51 percent of the sample recidivates within a year of release by the 
former measure, while 67 percent of the sample recidivates within a year by the latter.  Because 
the primary goal of this paper is to study whether exposure to peers with a criminal history in a 
particular crime category increases an individual’s propensity to recidivate in that same crime 
category, we use a subsequent criminal charge as our definition of recidivism.  This 
characterization permits individuals to recidivate in multiple crime categories (many do) and 
avoids a series of issues related to adjudication when an individual has been charged in multiple 
categories.11  Using this measure of recidivism, Table 1 shows that 14 percent of the sample 
recidivates with a burglary offense, 12 percent recidivates with a petty larceny offense, and 
approximately 9 percent recidivates with a felony drug offense, a misdemeanor drug offense, an 
auto theft, and a grand larceny offense.  Because individuals can be adjudicated for multiple 
offenses simultaneously, the sum of the recidivism rates in all possible crime categories is greater 
than the overall recidivism rate of 67 percent (i.e. the different possible outcome variables are not 
mutually exclusive). 
Throughout the paper we focus on nine main crime categories: auto theft, burglary, grand 
larceny, petty la rceny, robbery, felony drug crimes, misdemeanor drug crimes, aggravated assault 
and/or battery and felony weapons crimes, and felony sex crimes.  Appendix Table 1 contains 
descriptions of particular crimes associated with each of these categories.  These particular 
categories are chosen for analysis using three criterion: (i) the offense is serious enough to 
contribute to the FBI crime index; (ii) the crime is defined well enough to interpret the results; 
and (iii) enough individuals recidivate with the crime so that the estimation is reasonably precise.  
Disorderly conduct is not included, for example, because the exact nature of the offense may vary 
greatly across crimes, and misdemeanor sex offense is not included because only 27 of the 8,216 
individuals recidivate with this crime.   
The assignment of juveniles to facilities in Florida typically occurs in two steps.12  First, 
the judge determines the level of confinement that is appropriate for the individual.  There are 
five risk levels, minimum-, low-, moderate-, high-, and maximum-risk; minimum-risk facilities 
                                                 
11 Analogous specifications to those included in the paper with recidivism defined as a subsequent 
adjudication yielded qualitatively similar results.  
12 See National Center for Juvenile Justice (2003) and Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (2004) for 
more details. 
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are non-residential, and all other risk categories are residential.  In part, risk-level assignment is 
based on the characteristics of the juvenile’s current offense and past offenses.  For instance, 
individuals whose current offense is a first degree felony, a sex offense, or a firearm-related 
offense are automatically excluded from the low-risk category.  Given this judge-assigned risk 
level, the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice places the juvenile in a particular program.  
During our study period, each individual was assigned to one of 169 correctional facilities in 
Florida.  These facilities vary greatly in type: there are halfway houses, group treatment homes, 
boot camps, contracted day treatment programs, intensive residential treatment programs, sex 
offender programs, work and wilderness programs, etc.  Note that very few of these facilities are 
what one might consider a jail, where individuals are confined to particular cells.  There is some 
variation in the size of these facilities.  The average number of individuals released from a facility 
is 197 (averaged across the individuals in the sample), with a minimum of 13 and a maximum of 
981.  The average number of individuals in a facility on a given day is 48, with a large standard 
deviation of 74; the corresponding median facility size (across individuals), however, is only 20 
individuals, as a couple of facilities are particularly large.13 
The individual characteristics listed in Table 1 provide basic information on the youths’ 
age, gender, race, and sentence length.  The criminal history variables in Table 1 encompass all 
charges formally brought against the youth within the Florida system prior to placement in a 
correctional facility during the two-year evaluation period.  The individual criminal history 
variables are dummy variables that are equal to one if an individual has any history of committing 
a particular type of offense, regardless of the number of times the individual has committed the 
offense.  Thus, we see that 61 percent of the individuals in the sample have a history of petty 
larceny, 58 percent have a history of burglary, 37 percent have a history of a felony weapon 
offense, 13 percent have a history of a felony drug offense, and so on.  The neighborhood 
characteristics variables are constructed using each individual’s zip code of residence.  With the 
exception of Youth Crime Rate in Zip, which comes directly from DJJ records, these 
neighborhood measures are derived from the 1990 Census of Population of Housing.  
Table 1 also presents descriptive statistics for the measures of peer characteristics.  For 
the most part, the list of peer characteristics parallels the list of individual characteristics (the 
demographic, criminal history, and neighborhood characteristics).  The peer characteristics are 
calculated as weighted averages of the individual characteristics, where the weights are the 
number of days an individual is exposed to each peer.  Not surprisingly, the average peer group to 
                                                 
13 We examine specifications below that limit the sample to individuals in facilities with less than 20 peers. 
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which an individual is exposed generally reflects the distribution of crimes in the individual 
criminal histories.  Slight differences arise because the individual criminal history measures are 
averaged over individuals while the peer measures are averaged over days, thus weighting more 
heavily the crimes of individuals serving longer sentences. 
 
III. Empirical Methodology and Measurement Issues 
The primary analysis presented in this paper relates recidivism to vectors of individual 
characteristics, peer characteristics, and interactions between the two.  Recidivism is used as an 
imperfect proxy for criminal behavior throughout our analysis.  Clearly, recidivism is a function 
of both actual criminal activity and the probability of arrest and adjudication.  To the extent that 
some peer effects take the form of learning to avoid arrest and adjudication, we expect our 
analysis to understate  the overall level of increased criminal activity that follows exposure to 
peers with a greater intensity of experience in a given crime category.  On the other hand, it is 
possible that exposure to peers in prison makes and individual bolder or less cautious in his 
manner of committing crimes upon release; this type of machismo effect could lead to an increase 
in arrest rates even if the underlying level of criminal activity has not changed.  Despite these 
issues, recidivism, as previously defined, is the best measure available to us.14  The general 
specification that we take to the data can be written as  
 
                                              ijjijijijijij XPXPR elgba ++++=                                           (1) 
 
where Rij is a dummy variable that is equal to one if individual i, having served time in facility j, 
recidivates; Pij is a vector of peer characteristics; Xij is a vector of individual characteristics; and 
lj  is a facility fixed effect.  For each individual, the associated peer characteristics are a weighted 
average of the characteristics of an individual’s peers in a facility, where the weights are equal to 
the number of days an individual is exposed to each peer in the facility.  In this way, because 
individuals are admitted and released on a regular basis throughout our sample period, the 
characteristics of the peers to whom any particular individual is exposed vary depending on when 
exactly that individual enters and leaves a facility. 
                                                 
14 An additional issue common to studies using administrative data, and one which we are powerless to do 
anything about, is the possibility that a juvenile committed multiple crimes at a time (e.g. assault and drug 
dealing) but is arrested and adjudicated for only one offense (e.g. assault) due to a lack of evidence.  The 
extent to which this is an issue in our study ought to be limited by the fact that we define recidivism in 
terms of charges rather than adjudication. 
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The inclusion of facility fixed effects in equation (1) controls for the non-random 
assignment of individuals to facilities as well as any part of the error structure correla ted across 
all of the individuals in a facility.  This ensures that the impact of peers on recidivism is identified 
using only the variation in the length of time that any two individuals serving a sentence in the 
same facility happen to overlap.15  In order for this methodology to yield unbiased peer effects, 
the timing of the assignment of individuals to facilities, with respect to the particular peers in the 
facility at that time, must be as good as random within the two-year sample period.  We provide a 
series of exercises designed to demonstrate the validity of this identifying assumption throughout 
the analysis.   
Before turning to some initial evidence on our research design, however, it is important to 
point out an issue regarding the construction of peer measures.  In particular, in constructing peer 
measures, a question arises as to whether an individual should be included as part of her own peer 
measure.  On the one hand, if an individual is excluded from her own measure, this gives rise 
mechanically to a slight negative correlation between the corresponding individual and peer 
measures.  On the other hand, if an individual is included in her own measure, a mechanical 
positive correlation is induced.  It turns out, however, that it is straightforward to construct a 
measure that removes any such mechanical correlation.  In particular, by adding a fraction of an 
individual’s own characteristics to her peer measure equal to the average contribution that her 
characteristics make to the peer measures of others in the same facility, we ensure that no 
mechanical correlation is induced.  Such measures are particularly useful for demonstrating the 
validity of our identification strategy. 
 
Some Initial Evidence on Our Identifying Assumptions 
To provide some initial evidence on the validity of our identifying assumptions, Table 2 
shows the correlations between individual and peer measures that characterize past criminal 
experience in each of the nine crime categories that serve as the basis for our analysis.  Table 2a 
displays the raw correlations, that is, between measures that include variation both within and 
across facilities, while Table 2b shows correlations based only on within-facility variation.  In this 
                                                 
15 A natural concern that arises when including facility fixed effects is whether there is sufficient variation 
in the peer measures within facilities to identify peer effects precisely.  While the amount of variation in the 
peer measures does decrease with the inclusion of facility fixed effects, it is not eliminated.  This can be 
seen by comparing the overall standard deviation to the within standard deviation for each peer measure 
presented in Table 1.  The within standard deviation is the standard deviation of the residual peer measures 
that result from regressing the original peer measures on facility dummies. 
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case, we have first regressed each individual and peer measure on the full set of facility fixed 
effects, and the correlation of the residuals from these regressions is shown.   
The correlation coefficients in Table 2a are in many instances quite large, almost always 
positive, especially along the diagonal, and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in almost 
every case.  In fact, ignoring the off-diagonal correlations related to felony sex offenses, the 
correlations shown are positive and significant in every case both on and off the diagonal.16  In 
this way, not surprisingly, individuals with more extensive criminal histories are more likely to be 
assigned to the same facility and facility assignment is especially positively correlated for 
individuals that have each committed a particular crime. 
The corresponding correlation coefficients in the lower panel of the table are typically 
more than an order of magnitude smaller, negative almost as often as positive, and rarely 
statistically significant.  This implies that the within-facility variation in peer criminal history 
measures is almost completely orthogonal to an individual’s own criminal history.  Moreover, 
given that an individual’s own criminal experience is one of the strongest predictors of future 
criminal behavior and one of the factors most observable to the judges and DJJ officials 
responsible for the assignment of individuals to facilities, it is very likely that the within-facility 
variation in peer measures is also orthogonal to other unobserved individual characteristics 
related to recidivism.   
The lack of any systematic correlation in individual and peer criminal history also implies 
that there is not any undo clustering in the timing of assignment to correctional facilities for 
individuals with particular criminal histories.  Such timing might result not only because of 
deliberate actions on the part of judges and other DJJ officials, but would also arise naturally if, 
for example, there were significant trends in the types of crimes being committed in certain parts 
of Florida over this period.  Thus, this evidence on the correlation of individual and peer criminal 
history variables provides a clear support for the key identifying assumption that the within-
facility variation in peer characteristics is as good as randomly assigned.  We provide a good deal 
of additional evidence related to this core identifying assumption as we present the results below. 
 
Pre- and Post-Censoring 
 A final important data-related issue in constructing the peer measures used in equation 
(1) arises because we only observe individuals who are released in the two-year period from July 
                                                 
16 The negative correlation between an individual’s own history of a felony sex offense and a couple of the 
other peer measures is due to the fact that Florida maintains a couple of facilities dedicated to rehabilitating 
sex offenders. 
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1, 1997 to June 30, 1999.17  Thus, for individuals who are released towards the beginning of the 
sample period, any peers who are released before the sample period begins will not be observed 
in the data (pre-censoring case).  Likewise, for individuals who are released towards the end of 
the sample period, any peers who are released after the sample ends will be unobserved (post-
censoring case).  While we are unable to measure each individual’s peers exactly, we are able to 
calculate an unbiased estimate of each individual’s peer exposure under the assumption that the 
within-facility variation in peer characteristics is random with respect to when an individual is 
assigned to the facility.  This, of course, is the central identifying assumption of the paper and we 
provide a wide variety of evidence related to its validity throughout the paper.  
In particular, in order to provide an unbiased estimate of each individual’s peers, we 
estimate each individual’s exposure to peers who would have been released either before or after 
the sample period by using the characteristics of the individuals observed to be released from the 
facility during the full sample period.  In this way, we form the peer measure used in the analysis 
by averaging (i) the characteristics of those peers actually observed to overlap with the individual 
and (ii) a properly weighted measure of the estimated characteristics of the peers with whom this 
individual would have overlapped, but who were released outside of the sample period.18  This 
ensures that the peer measure used in the analysis is an unbiased measure of the true peer measure 
for each individual as long as the sample of individuals released during the study period is not 
systematically different than those released just before or after it.  In this way, while our 
subsequent peer measure is subject to some measurement error, this error is uncorrelated with the 
individual characteristics included in the regression.  We describe the exact procedure used to 
construct the peer measure, dealing with four separate cases of censoring, in the appendix.  We 
also provide evidence below that the remaining measurement error is likely to have a reasonably 
small effect on the results.  In particular, as expected, this form of measurement error appears to 
have an attenuating effect on the estimated peer effects, but generally does not mask the 
underlying qualitative pattern of effects.  
 
                                                 
17 Note that this sample structure does not limit our ability to observe sentences of any length.  The 
individuals that we observe serving longer sentences simply tend to have been admitted earlier, sometimes 
well before our study period begins.  
18 This procedure relies on the assumption that, conditional on facility assignment, the exact date at which a 
given individual is assigned to a facility is random with respect to the peers in the facility at that time—an 
assumption supported by the evidence described throughout the paper.   
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IV. Results 
The earlier discussion of the potential channels through which peers may influence an 
individual’s subsequent criminal behavior informs the empirical specifications that we take to the 
data.  In particular, we consider the following primary specification: 
 
    ( )0 1 2* _ _h h h h hij ij i j ij ij ij ij j ijR Offense Peer offense Peer offense Offense P Xb b b a g l e= + + + + + +  (2) 
 
The dependent variable, Rhij, is a dummy variable for whether or not individual i in facility j 
recidivates with offense type h.  Peer_offensehij represents an individual’s exposure to peers with 
a history of offense type h, while Offensehij is a dummy variable indicating whether or not 
individual i has a history of offense type h himself.  Pij is a vector of additional peer demographic  
and criminal history characteristics, including all other crime categories.  Similarly, Xij represents 
a number of individual demographic and criminal history controls, including all other crime 
categories.  Equation (2) is simultaneously estimated for each of nine crime categories using a 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework.19 
While the specification described in equation (2) includes a complete set of controls for 
individual and peer criminal offenses, the central focus of the analysis below is on the question of 
whether exposure to peers with a history of committing a particular crime increases the likelihood 
that an individual recidivates with that same crime.  We also aim to distinguish whether or not 
this effect varies with an individual’s own characteristics, particularly an individual’s own history 
of the offense in question.  This interaction would pick up the reinforcement of addictive behavior 
by others who may share a similar addiction. Moreover, the peer effect mechanisms related to 
social learning and network formation developed in the introduction suggest that individuals with 
a prior history in a particular criminal activity may be especially receptive to additional training 
or to expanding network ties related to this activity.  Consider, for example, an individual who 
already has a high rate of return from stealing cars but has no experience in drug crimes.  For this 
individual, the drug-specific human capital gained from exposure to peers with a history of drug 
crimes may not provide sufficient incentive to switch from auto theft to drug crimes, as the gap 
between the rates of return for the two types of crimes may be too large.  On the other hand, 
additional exposure to peers with a history of auto theft may increase this gap in returns (as well 
                                                 
19 The standard errors that are reported for this system of regressions that include facility fixed effects are 
not further adjusted for clustering at the facility level.  An analysis of the effects of controlling for 
clustering in a series of separate regressions had almost no effect on the estimated standard errors for 
models that included facility fixed effects.  In fact, the standard errors on our parameters of interest 
decreased about as often as they increased. 
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as the gap between returns from auto theft and legitimate activity), thereby potentially increasing 
an individual’s propensity to commit auto theft upon release.  
While the inclusion of facility fixed effects provides an intuitive way of forcing the peer 
effects to be identified based on within-facility variation in peer exposure, the inclusion of 
interactions between individual and peer characteristics require a slightly modified approach.  In 
particular, in estimating the model, we subtract the facility-level mean from the peer measure, 
thereby ensuring that variation in the peer measure is based only on within-facility variation, 
regardless of whether the peer measure is included directly or interacted with individual 
characteristics.20  It is important to emphasize that we include this form of the interaction term in 
every specification that includes fixed effects reported in the paper.   
Each column of Tables 3a-3d reports the coefficients b0, b1, and b2 for a specification of 
the type shown in equation (2) for a particular offense type h.21,22  Table 3a reports these 
coefficients for a specification that includes only these three variables and does not include 
facility fixed effects; Table 3b adds facility fixed effects and subtracts the facility-level mean 
from the peer measure in the interaction term to ensure that its variation is based only on within-
facility variation; Table 3c includes additional controls for peer characteristics; and Table 3d 
includes additional controls for individual characteristics.  Table 3d serves as our baseline 
specification.  The full list of additional individual and peer measures is shown in Appendix 
Table 2 and includes measures characterizing criminal history in particular crime categories, total 
number of past felonies, age at first offense, current age, sex, and characteristics of the residential 
zip code for both the individual and her peers.   
We report the key coefficients for these four specifications to highlight a number of 
aspects of the results.  First, a comparison of Table 3a to Table 3b reveals how the results of an 
analysis that used both across- and within-facility variation in the key peer measure would differ 
                                                 
20 Without this adjustment to the peer measure, the inclusion of facility fixed effects alone would not 
insulate the estimate of the interaction terms against a subtle form of selection bias.  Using the burglary 
regression as an example, if those individuals with a past history of burglary who were particularly likely to 
recidivate were also clustered in the same facility (and thus likely to have a high value for peer_burglary), 
the model would return a positive coefficient on the interaction of individual and peer burglary even if 
facility fixed effects were included in the regression.  Subtracting the facility mean from the peer measure, 
on the other hand, ensures that the estimated peer effects are based only on within-facility variation. 
 
21 While we look for evidence of peer effects in particular crime categories (such as grand larceny), it is 
certainly possible that individuals specialize in groups of particular crime categories (such as all thefts) 
rather than in just one particular crime category.  Appendix Table 2 reports the results of the full impact of 
an individual’s criminal history on the propensity to commit each crime, generally revealing broad 
specialization across drug crimes as well all forms of theft.  This specification corresponds to the one 
reported in Table 5. 
22 Again, the particular crimes associated with each of these categories are shown in Appendix Table 1.   
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from an analysis using only within-facility variation.  A comparison of Table 3b to Table 3c 
shows that the addition of other peer measures to the specification does very little to the 
coefficients of primary interest.  Finally, a comparison of Table 3c to Table 3d reveals the effect 
of including individual controls.  If such controls are truly uncorrelated with peer measures, the 
central identifying assumption on which our research design is predicated, the inclusion of 
individual characteristics should have no effect on the estimated peer effects.  In fact the addition 
of individual controls moves the estimated coefficients on the reported peer measures only 
slightly, if at all, thus providing additional support for our central identifying assumption. 
  
Specialization 
We begin our discussion of the results shown in Table 3 by focusing first on the 
estimated coefficients on Offensehij, a variable that indicates whether an individual’s own history 
includes the crime shown in the corresponding column.  These measures illustrate the degree to 
which individuals specialize in crime category h.  Since the parameter b2 is reported at the mean 
level of peer characteristics, a test for specialization is simply a test of whether b2 > 0.  The 
estimates of b2 are comparable across the four specifications, declining slightly in magnitude with 
the inclusion of other individual controls in Table 3d, not surprisingly.   
Focusing on the final specification reported in Table 3d, there is evidence of 
specialization in every crime category, i.e., the coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant in every instance.  The magnitudes of the effects are best understood in relation to the 
proportion of individuals who recidivate with each crime.  For example, having committed a 
felony drug crime in the past increases one’s likelihood of recidivating with a felony drug crime 
by approximately 21 percentage points; this is relative to the baseline that 9.3 percent of the 
individuals released from a juvenile facility recidivate with a drug felony within a year.  
Similarly, large effect sizes relative to the proportion of individuals who recidivate with a crime 
can be seen for felony sex crimes (5.4 percentage points versus 1.3 percent of individuals), 
misdemeanor drug crimes (12 percentage points versus 9 percent), robbery (4.7 percentage points 
versus 4.5 percent), auto theft (8.1 percentage points versus 9.3 percent), and aggravated assault 
and felony weapon crimes (7.9 percentage points versus 13.6 percent).  While these effects are 
not the main focus of our analysis, they are certainly broadly consistent with the extensive 
previous literature related to specialization. 
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Evidence of Peer Effects 
The first row of Tables 3a-d reports b0, the coefficient on the interaction between an 
individual’s history of having committed the relevant offense and the fraction of peers who have 
ever committed this offense.  The second row reports b1, the coefficient on the fraction of peers 
who have ever committed this offense.23  This parameter reveals how the intensity of exposure to 
peers with experience in a particular crime category affects the behavior of individuals who do 
not have any prior experience in that crime category.  Table 3a, which does not include facility 
fixed effects, reveals positive and significant peer effects for those without prior experience in a 
category for six of the nine crime categories.  As soon as facility fixed effects are included, 
however, all such evidence vanishes.  In the final specification, presented in Table 3d, b1 is 
negative as often as it is positive, with no statistically significant evidence of increases in any 
crime category and statistically significant evidence of a decrease in activity for the case of 
robbery.   One possible explanation for the evidence of negative peer effects in this latter case is 
that individuals learn that the risk-return tradeoff for robbery is less favorable to the criminal than 
the tradeoff for other types of property crimes (auto theft, larceny, and burglary). 24     
That these broad crime-specific peer effects measured by b1 in Table 3a are eliminated 
when the variation in the peer measures used in the analysis is restricted to within-facility 
variation implies that the effects based on across-facility variation are mostly driven by the non-
random assignment of individuals to facilities rather than true peer effects.  The appearance of 
positive peer effects could easily result, for example, from a process that assigns individuals to 
facilities based in part on aspects of their propensity to recidivate that are unobserved.   
In contrast, in the final specification reported in Table 3d,  the parameter estimates for b0 
reported in the first row are positive in almost every case and statistically significant for burglary, 
                                                 
23 It is interesting to note that specifications run at an earlier stage of our analysis show that it is whether or 
not peers have a history of ever committing a particular offense, rather than the number of times they have 
committed the offense, that matters in the context of peer effects.  In other words, the peer effects 
associated with the peers’ first offense in a crime category appear to be much more important than the peer 
effects associated with the third or fourth offense in that category. 
24 Levitt and Lochner (2001) estimate that the average return to both a property crime and a robbery is 
about $200, but because victims are more likely to report robberies to the police, they assert, there is a 
higher arrest rate for robbery and more severe punishments conditional on arrest.  They estimate that the 
average sentence length per crime committed served by juveniles for robbery is more than twenty times that 
served for other types of property crimes.  An analysis of our data yields similar statistics for sentence 
length (conditional on arrest and a punishment that involves assignment to a correctional facility).  A 
regression of sentence length on recent and past criminal activity is reported in Appendix Table 3. 
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petty larceny, misdemeanor drug crimes, and felony sex offenses.25  In the case of burglary, 
misdemeanor drug crimes, and felony sex offenses, the combination of b0  and b1  reveals a 
statistically significant, positive peer effect for individuals who have prior experience in a crime 
category.  Thus, exposure to a greater percentage of peers with a history of having committed 
burglary, for example, increases the likelihood that an individual with prior burglary experience 
commits burglary upon release.   
In order to get a sense of the magnitudes of these reinforcing peer effects, it is helpful to 
consider the magnitude of these effects relative to the baseline propensity of an individual who 
has a history of having committed the corresponding crime.  The coefficient of 0.20 on the 
interaction of own and peer offense for burglary, for example, implies that an increase in the 
fraction of peers with a past burglary offense from the mean of 0.57 to 0.67 would increase the 
propensity of an individual with a past history of burglary to commit burglary from 0.063 to 
0.079.26  Likewise, the coefficient of 0.25 on the interaction of own and peer offense for 
misdemeanor drug crimes, for example, implies that an increase in the fraction of peers with a 
past misdemeanor drug offense from 0.15 to 0.25 would increase the propensity of an individual 
with a past history of a misdemeanor drug offense to recidivate in this category from 0.120 to 
0.141.  Finally, a ten percent increase at the mean in the fraction of peers with a felony sex 
offense would increase the propensity of an individual with a past history of a felony sex offense 
to recidivate in that category from 0.054 to 0.086.  In this way, the estimated magnitudes of these 
peer effects are certainly sizeable, but also appear to be reasonable given the intensity of peer 
exposure in these relatively small juvenile correctional facilities.27  
Taken as a whole, the evidence presented in Table 3d helps to distinguish between the 
potential mechanisms through which individuals might be influenced by their peers.  The general 
pattern of this evidence is that exposure to peers with a history of having committed a particular 
offense has a strong influence on those individuals who already have some experience with that 
offense but little, if any, impact on individuals with no prior experience in this category.   One 
explanation that fits well with this pattern is that peers may reverse the traditional negative stigma 
and they may reinforce addictive behavior.  Another explanation is that individuals may 
                                                 
25 Note, however, that the magnitude of the combined effect of b0  and b1 is often smaller than the 
magnitude of b0 alone due to the above mentioned negative coefficients on b1 .   
26 Note that the direct effect of peer characteristics is incorporated in constructing these examples as well. 
27 The only study that we could find that explored these types of interaction effects in a setting where the 
peers are randomly assign is a study of the effect of college roommate drinking on GPA, Kremer and Levy 
(2004), which also finds evidence of a large reinforcing peer effect.  Specifically, they find that, on 
average, males assigned to roommates who reported drinking prior to entering college had a one-quarter 
point lower GPA than those assigned non-drinking roommates.  This effect is four times as large, a full 
point GPA, for males who themselves had a history of frequent drinking prior to college. 
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experience different returns from participation in different types of crimes (or the legitimate 
sector of the economy) related to natural abilities, opportunities, human capital accumulation, 
involvement in crime networks, or other factors.  In this case, individuals who have a history of 
committing a particular offense have already revealed themselves to have high returns and, likely, 
substantial human capital related to this type of crime.  Consequently, access to peers who can 
increase the individual’s returns to this type of crime may lead to increased intensity of activity in 
this type of crime.  Access to peers who can increase returns for another type of crime may be 
much less valuable, as this may not decrease the gap in returns between crime categories enough 
to change an individual’s choice of type of crime.28 
A Further Test of Our Central Identifying Assumption 
 While it is obviously impossible to test whether unobserved attributes of an individual 
related to recidivism in a particular crime category are uncorrelated with the within-facility 
variation in peer measures, it is straightforward to examine whether these peer measures are 
uncorrelated with observable individual attributes.  While Table 2b shows the within-facility 
correlation between individual and peer criminal histories, the structure of the specifications 
reported in Table 3 suggests a natural way to combine the information about an individual into a 
single measure related to recidivism in a particular crime category, thereby providing a much 
more general test.  To construct such a measure, we first regress recidivism in each of the nine 
crime categories on the full set of individual characteristics determined at the time of assignment 
and the full set of facility fixed effects.29  From these regressions, we calculate a predicted 
recidivism measure in each crime category for each individual using only the observable  
individual characteristics.  Consequently, this measure of predicted recidivism captures that part 
of recidivism that can be explained by observable attributes related to an individual’s prior 
criminal history, age, sex, race, age at first offense, and residential neighborhood.   
Table 4a reports the results of regressing this measure of predicted recidivism on the two 
peer measures of primary interest for each crime category.  Table 4b repeats these regressions 
adding facility fixed effects.30  In Table 4a, the estimated coefficients are positive and significant 
for each crime category for the direct effect of peer criminal history, and the interaction term adds 
a further positive and significant component for individuals with a prior history in six of the nine 
crime categories.  Thus, clearly, when both across- and within- facility variation in peer 
                                                 
28 Put another way, it is important to distinguish between learning from one’s peers and how that learning 
that gets translated into subsequent criminal behavior.  The suggestion here is that an individual may have 
more to learn in a new crime category; thus, learning in a category in which the individual already has 
experience may be more likely to be translated into action.   
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characteristics is used in the analysis, there is a strong positive correlation between individual 
characteristics related to recidivism in a particular crime category and the exposure to peers with 
a history of crime in that same category.      
 In Table 4b, on the other hand, where only within-facility variation in peers is used in 
both measures, we see almost no evidence of correlation between peer characteristics and 
predicted recidivism.  In fact, for individuals without a prior history of having committed the 
corresponding offense, the coefficients are significant in only two cases, and in all cases the 
magnitudes are quite small.  Thus, to the extent that there is any bias at all, there may be a slight 
upward bias in b1 for robbery and felony sex offenses, a bias that would tend to attenuate the 
negative coefficient on robbery in the main specification shown in Table 3d.  The interaction 
terms reported in Table 4b are significant in only one case, robbery, and in this case the effect is 
actually negative, implying that, if anything, the coefficients on the interaction term associated 
with robbery (and to a lesser extent felony drug and felony sex crimes) in our main specification 
are biased downwards.  In general, then, this very strenuous test of our central identifying 
assumption strongly supports the conclusions that: (i) there is almost no correlation of the within-
facility variation in peer measures with the key individual attributes related to recidivism in each 
crime category and (ii) any analysis of peer effects that incorporates across-facility variation is 
likely to lead to sizeable biases in the estimated effects, which is exactly what we found in 
comparing Table 3a to Table 3b.     
 
Peer Effects in Small Facilities  
 To this point in the paper, we have defined an individual’s peer measures to be a 
weighted average of the characteristics of all other individuals serving time in the correctional 
facility concurrently with this individual at some point during his sentence.  This definition 
potentially provides a noisy measure of an individual’s peer exposure; this would occur if an 
individual does not actually interact with all of the individuals within a facility or interacts more 
intensely with certain individuals.31  Given our specification, which allows the effect of peers to 
vary with an individual’s own characteristics, it is generally not possible to sign the bias that 
                                                                                                                                                 
29 We leave out the total number of days an individual spends in the facility to avoid concerns about the 
endogeneity of this characteristic. 
30 As described previously, the facility-level mean is subtracted from the peer measure to ensure that the 
interaction term only captures within-facility variation in the peer measure. 
31 Identification of the appropriate peer group is a common problem in the peer effects literature.  
Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2002) find no evidence that peer groups are formed along racial lines in 
medical school, though they find some evidence that peer groups are formed along gender lines.  Similarly, 
Sacerdote (2000) examines whether peer effects among college students occur at the room or dorm level. 
 20
would result if true peer groups consisted of a smaller subset of the individuals within a facility.32  
Therefore, in order to explore whether the estimated peer effects for our main specification are 
sensitive to any bias resulting from assigning peer measures at the facility level, we present an 
additional specification analogous to that shown in Table 3d that restricts the sample to only 
facilities with an average of 20 or fewer individuals concurrently serving sentences.33   
Table 5 presents the results from estimating equation (2) for the resulting sample of 4,266 
individuals in the 115 smallest facilities.34  Clearly, one would expect there to be greater 
interaction between all youths in a facility with 10 individuals than in one with 100; thus, 
restricting the sample to smaller facilities ought to reduce any noise in the peer measure due to 
variation in intensity of exposure of individuals to one another within a given facility.  The results 
of this specification strengthen the general pattern of the results— namely that the effect of peers 
on recidivism is significantly greater for individuals with a prior history of having committed the 
same offense.  The interactions between an individual’s own experience with an offense and the 
intensity of exposure to peers with experience in that crime category are now positive in every 
crime category; this positive reinforcement is now statistically significant for robbery and felony 
drug offenses as well as for burglary, petty larceny, misdemeanor drug offenses, and felony sex 
offenses.  As in the case of the entire sample of facilities presented in Table 3d, there is minimal 
evidence that the intensity of exposure to peers with experience in a particular crime category 
affects the behavior of individuals who do not have any prior experience in that crime category.  
Using the sample of relatively small facilities, b1 is still negative more often than it is positive; 
now there is only weak statistical evidence of a decrease in activity for the case of petty larceny.   
In comparison to the results obtained when using the entire sample of facilities, the 
magnitudes of the reinforcing coefficients are generally either similar in size or greater for this 
specification based on small facilities.  In fact, the coefficient for felony drug offenses increases 
from 0.059 when using the entire sample to 0.36 when using the sample of small facilities.  This 
makes it such that, as in the case of specialization, the largest reinforcing peer effect occurs for 
                                                 
32 Manski (1993) points out that it is impossible to identify the true reference group without some a priori 
knowledge of the way that individuals interact within a larger group, see Section 2.5 in particular.  In 
general, depending on how peer characteristics are defined in the analysis and how individuals actually 
interact, the mis -specification of the proper reference group can bias the results in any direction.     
33 The full specifications for the results summarized in Table 5 are reported in Appendix Table 2.   
34 One issue in looking at facility size is that we only know the number of individuals released from a 
facility as opposed to the number of individuals incarcerated in a facility.  Using the number of individuals 
released as a measure of facility size may be an inaccurate reflection of actual facility size since one may 
expect to see more releases from facilities with shorter sentences.  Thus, we create an index of facility size 
that equals the number of individuals released from a facility multiplied by the average sentence length in 
each facility.  These 4,266 individuals are from facilities with a facility size index less than 15,000. 
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the case of felony drug offenses.35  The magnitude of this effect implies that for an individual 
who has a felony drug offense history, increasing the fraction of an individual’s peers with a 
felony drug history from the mean of 0.16 to 0.26, would increase his propensity to recidivate 
with a felony drug offense from 0.190 to 0.232.36     
 
Trends in Crime and the Clustering of Assignment 
 A potential alternative explanation for the evidence of peer effects described in Table 3d 
and Table 5 relates to trends in criminal activity.  If, for example, there is a general upwards trend 
in felony drug crimes over the course of our sample, then individuals will likely be exposed to a 
higher proportion of peers with a history of felony drug crimes and will also be more likely to 
recidivate with a felony drug crime themselves.  While the correlation matrix shown in Table 2 
and the implicit test of our identifying assumptions shown in Table 4b provide evidence that this 
is not likely to be the case, we can also address this possibility directly by estimating a 
specification that controls for time trends for various regions of the state.  In particular, Table 6 
presents the results for a specification that includes quarterly time dummies for each of the twenty 
judicial circuits in Florida; that is, a vector of 160 interactions between eight quarter of release 
dummies and twenty dummies indicating judicial circuit is included in the estimation.  Table 6a 
includes all individuals in the sample while Table 6b again restricts the sample to individuals in 
small facilities.  Comparing the results to those presented in Tables 3d and 5, respectively, we 
find that there is almost no change in the patterns and the significance of the coefficients in each 
case.  Examining the effects in small facilities, for example, there is still a positive reinforcing 
peer effect in all crime categories, and it is significant for burglary, petty larceny, robbery, felony 
drug offenses, misdemeanor drug offenses, and felony sex offenses.  Similarly, there is still little 
evidence that the intensity of exposure to peers with experience in a particular crime category 
affects the behavior of individuals who do not have any prior experience in that crime category.  
In this way, the estimated peer effects in our main specifications are completely robust to general 
or localized trends in activity in any of the crime categories considered in our analysis.  
 A related potential alternative explanation for the evidence of peer effects described in 
Table 3d and Table 5 concerns the facility assignment of individuals who have committed crimes 
together.  If, for example, individuals who belong to the same gang have similar criminal histories 
                                                 
35 Additional specifications, not included in the paper, show that the strong evidence of peer effects seen for 
felony drug crimes is primarily being driven by felony non-marijuana drug crimes.   
36 One may expect the reinforcing peer effects estimated for drug offenses to be especially large since the 
potential mechanisms described in the introduction are particularly applicable to drug offenses; i.e. 
addiction is likely to play a large role in drug offenses and crime-specific human capital accumulation and 
network formation are likely to be particularly important for the distribution of drugs. 
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and are sentenced to the same facility at similar times, we might estimate positive interactions 
between peer and individual criminal history variables in our recidivism regressions even in the 
absence of peer effects.  We address this potential issue by examining clustering in the 
assignment of individuals to facilities on the basis of residential zip code.  As a starting point, it is 
important to note that individuals are not generally exposed to very many individuals from the 
same zip code.  In particular, of the average of 189 individuals released from a facility, an 
individual is exposed to an average of only 6 from the same zip code.  Thus, individuals from the 
same zip code generally contribute only about two to three percent of the characteristics used in 
calculating an individual’s peer measures.  
 Table 7 tests whether there is any undue clustering of release or admit dates for 
individuals from the same zip code.  The upper panel of the table reports the fraction of 
individuals released or admitted within a certain time period who share the same zip code.  Of the 
individuals released within seven days of one another, 2.8 percent share the same zip code, while 
of all of the individuals released from the same facility, 2.7 percent share the same zip code.  
Restricting attention to the set of individuals admitted during the first half of our study period,37 
2.9 percent of those admitted within seven days of one another share the same zip code, while 2.8 
percent of those admitted during the first year of our sample period share the same zip code.  In 
testing whether the fraction of individuals who share the same zip code is higher for those 
released or admitted closer to one another in time, we examine the difference between the 
proportion released (admitted) from the same zip code in a specified time period and the 
proportion released (admitted) from the same zip code in the overall sample.  None of the twelve 
differences, for the entire sample and the sample of small facilities, reported in the lower panel of 
Table 7 are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  More importantly, even if these 
differences were statistically significant, the magnitudes of these differences, which are on the 
order of 0.1-0.4 percent, would contribute so little to the variation in the peer measures used in 
our analysis that such neighborhood clustering cannot possibility explain even a small fraction of 
the results presented in Table 3d and Table 5.   
 
Censoring and Measurement Error 
 To test the robustness of our measures of peer exposure to the measurement error 
associated with the censoring of the sample (the fact that we do not observe peers released before 
                                                 
37 We restrict the sample to this period because we observe most of the individuals admitted during this 
period, missing only those serving particularly long sentences.  In general, because our sample is based on 
all individuals released during a two-year period, we are not able to characterize all of the individuals 
admitted during any particular period. 
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the beginning or after the end of our sample period), we estimate equation (2) using only those 
individuals who are released during the middle year of our sample, December 30, 1997 through 
December 30, 1998.  Because the average sentence length for the sample is less than six months, 
only a small portion of the peer exposure measure must be estimated for these individuals.  The 
estimated coefficients of interest for this regression are presented in Table 8.  The pattern of 
results is remarkably similar to the main specification presented in Table 3d, continuing to reveal: 
(i) a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term for burglary, misdemeanor drug, 
and felony sex offenses; (ii) a similarly-sized coefficient for the interaction term associated with 
petty larceny; (iii) minimal evidence of any peer effects for individuals without a history of 
having committed a particular crime; and (iv) a negative peer effect for robbery individuals 
without a history of having committed robbery.  While the pattern of results is remarkably 
consistent, as expected, the magnitudes of the effect sizes in Table 8 are generally greater than 
those reported in Table 3d.  In this way, the form of measurement error induced by the fact that 
we predict a portion of the peer measure appears to have an attenuating effect on the estimated 
peer effects, but generally is not sufficient to conceal the general pattern of results. 
 
Residential Versus Non-Residential Facilities 
While we do not have enough data to examine peer effects separately for each type of 
programming used in the state, we are, in fact, able to estimate the model separately depending on 
whether a facility is residential or non-residential.   Individuals in the lowest risk category are 
assigned to non-residential facilities typically close to their homes (94 percent are in the same 
county as an individual’s residence), while all others are assigned to residential facilities typically 
much further from home (only 27 percent are in the county of residence).  Peer effects might 
differ in such facilities for a number of different reasons.  First, individuals committed to 
residential facilities may have more time to interact with the other individuals in the same facility.  
Secondly, the nature of peer effects may vary with the amount of criminal experience of an 
individual and his peers, which will tend to be smaller in non-residential facilities.  Finally, 
individuals in non-residential facilities tend to be particularly close to home and may form 
relationships that extend beyond the facilities and onto the street corner even while serving time.  
Thus, interactions between individuals from non-residential facilities may be particularly likely to 
lead to more ‘hands-on’ human capital accumulation or to facilitate involvement in local criminal 
networks.   
Tables 9a and 9b present the results of estimating equation (2) when the sample is 
restricted to the 6,992 individuals in residential facilities and the 1,224 individuals in non-
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residential facilities, respectively.  Not surprisingly given that they contain over 85 percent of the 
full sample, the pattern of results for residential facilities generally mirrors the results for the 
sample as a whole presented in Table 3d.  The results presented in Table 9b show that peer effects 
in non-residential facilities differ dramatically from those in residential facilities.  In non-
residential facilities, there is evidence of direct peer effects associated with burglary and 
misdemeanor drug offenses.  Moreover, there are significantly positive reinforcing peer effects 
for auto theft, robbery and felony drug offenses.  Thus, in non-residential facilities there is 
evidence of strong peer effects in the case of auto theft, which has been absent from previous 
specifications, and evidence of an extremely strong peer effect in the case of felony drug 
offenses.  A potential explanation for these effects is that the crimes of auto theft and felony drugs 
are largely dependent on network creation and expansion, processes that may be largely 
facilitated by being sentenced to a non-residential facility, where individuals tend to come from a 
reasonably small geographic area, thereby enabling them to continue their interactions in the 
evenings outside of the facility and upon completion of their sentences.38  While these results are 
based on a much smaller sample of individuals than the full specification, they point to a 
particularly problematic practical concern with the operation of non-residential facilities, which 
out of necessity must be close to the homes of the individuals assigned to them.  Namely, the 
assignment of individuals to facilities close to home and, therefore, with many other individuals 
who live within reasonable proximity of one another, may in fact increase subsequent criminal 
activity through the operation of particularly strong, network-related peer effects.   
 
V. Policy Considerations  
Given the strong and robust evidence of reinforcing peer effects in correctional facilities, 
two policy-related issues merit further examination: the optimal assignment of individuals to 
facilities and how peer quality is distributed across individuals and facilities.  With regards to 
optimal assignment, our results point to a broad conclusion.  The evidence presented in this paper 
overwhelmingly supports the notion that exposure to peers with experience in a particular crime 
category has its greatest effect on individuals who themselves already have some experience in 
that category.  Given these results, a policy of optimal assignment should generally involve 
                                                 
38 Ayres and Levitt (1998) describe the types of networks that exist in auto theft rings.  Stolen cars must be 
transferred from the individual who steals the car to a chop-shop or another appropriate sales outlet.  As in 
other forms of organized crime, such a transaction may require a level of confidence that the individual will 
not reveal the network if arrested.  
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avoiding the grouping of individuals with others who have a history of committing the same 
crimes.    
To examine whether Florida’s assignment of individuals to facilities is generally in line 
with this recommendation, we return to Table 1, which in addition to reporting means and overall 
standard deviations for each variable also reports the standard deviation within facilities 
(eliminating that part of the variation resulting from variation across facilities).  As the figures in 
the table clearly demonstrate, there is almost as much variation in individual experience within 
facilities as there is in the data as a whole.  Thus, during our study period, Florida did not 
generally isolate individuals who had committed a particular offense, such as a drug offense, in 
specific facilities.39  Consequently, Florida’s facility assignment mechanism was broadly 
consistent with a policy aimed at reducing the impact of peer effects in correctional facilities.40  
The second policy-related issue we consider is how peer quality is distributed across 
individuals and facilities.  Specifically, we explore two types of questions: Are individuals with 
certain demographic or criminal history characteristics more likely to be exposed to a better or 
worse peer group?  And to what extent is peer quality correlated with facility characteristics such 
as security level or management type (e.g., private for-profit, private nonprofit, or publicly 
operated)?   
 While one could directly examine the distribution of peers across facilities on the basis of 
any given observable characteristic, we seek to summarize how all the characteristics of one’s 
peers contribute to the propensity to commit particular crimes.  To this end, we construct a 
measure for each facility that summarizes the average impact of the peers in that facility on 
recidivism of each type of crime.  In other words, we use the estimated coefficients from the 
                                                 
39 It is interesting to note that subsequent to our study period, Florida did begin using treatment facilities 
specially designed to handle individuals with drug addiction problems.  While our analysis would imply 
that reinforcing peer effects would generally be greater in such a facility, it is important to stress that the 
overall impact of a policy of rigorous treatment of drug addictions, which requires individuals with past 
histories with drug crimes to be housed together, may certainly have the desired effect on recidivism if the 
program itself is effective.  Our analysis points to the reinforcing nature of peer effects related to drug 
crimes in an institutional setting that was not generally designed to treat drug addiction problems directly. 
40 It is noteworthy that for the one type of crime that Florida did isolate offenders during our study period, 
sex offenses, the facilities designed to handle sex offenders were remarkably effective at reducing 
subsequent recidivism with a sex offense.  This inference can be made by comparing the results on the 
interaction term for felony sex offenses in Table 3a and Table 3b.  This parameter in Table 3a, which uses 
both within- and across- variation, and is consequently identified for the most part by the differences in the 
recidivism of sex offenders in specially designed facilities versus facilities more generally, reveals a strong 
negative effect for the interaction term.  This effect then turns positive when only within-facility variation 
is used in Table 3b, thereby implying that these specially designed facilities for sex offenders are 
particularly effective in reducing recidivism. 
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regression described by equation (2) for small facilities, and presented in Appendix Table 2,41 to 
calculate 
 
                          ( )0 1ˆ ˆˆ ˆ* __h h hh jj jj jR Peer offense POffense Peer offenseb b a= + +                       (3) 
 
ˆ h
jR  is the average effect of peer characteristics on recidivism with crime category h in facility j.  
To provide a single summary measure of the impact of peers on crime in general, we also create a 
total crime index, which is a weighted average of ˆ hjR  across the nine crime categories.  For 
weights, we use the average sentence length associated with committing each crime, which 
captures to some degree the seriousness of the crime.  Felony sex offenses, robbery, and felony 
weapon offenses receive the three largest weights, respectively.42 
 We then regress the estimated peer effect for crime category h, ˆ hjR , on a vector of 
individual characteristics, as in equation (4),  and on a vector of facility characteristics, as in 
equation (5). 
 
                                                            ˆ hj ij ij ijR X Jb g e= + +                                                         (4) 
                                                            ˆ hj j ij ijR F Jd g e= + +                                                      (5) 
 
The vector of individual characteristics, Xij, includes demographic and criminal history variables; 
these variables are identical to those included in equation (2).  Fj contains two sets of dummy 
variables—the first indicates the risk level associated with the facility, and the second indicates 
whether the facility is publicly managed by the state, publicly managed by a county,43 or privately 
managed by either a nonprofit or for-profit corporation.  Jij  is a vector of judicial circuit dummies.  
A significant and positive coefficient on an individual characteristic implies that this 
                                                 
41 We choose to use the estimated peer effects for small facilities as peer exposure is likely to be more 
precisely measured in these facilities. 
42 Appendix Table 3 displays the regression used to determine the average sentence length associated with 
each of the nine crime categories.  Sentence length is regressed on individual characteristic variables, 
dummy variables for the most recent crime committed, and dummy variables for whether a particular crime 
was committed in the past.  All variables are constructed to have mean zero.  The weight on felony drug 
crimes, for example, is then equal to the constant plus the coefficient on having committed a felony drug 
crime as the most recent offense.  The weights are normalized such that their sum is equal to one. 
43 All county-operated facilities in Florida are boot camps.  They are managed directly by their counties’ 
sheriff’s departments, with oversight from the DJJ. 
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characteristic predicts the assignment to facilities with peers who, on average, increase the 
propensity to recidivate with a particular crime.  Similarly, a significant and positive coefficient 
on a facility characteristic implies that this type of facility generally contains worse peers.  The 
results from the estimation of equations (4) and (5), for each of the nine crime categories and the 
total crime index, are presented in Table 10a and Table 10b, respectively. 
 A number of interesting and significant patterns stand out.  First, females are less likely 
to be exposed to worse peers than males in five of the nine crime categories including the more 
serious crimes of felony drug offenses, aggravated assault and felony weapon offenses, and 
robbery.  They are more likely to be exposed to worse peers for the cases of auto theft, burglary 
and grand larceny.  It is important to note, however, that these results are based on the assumption 
that peer effects are the same for males and females.  Due to the small number of females in the 
sample, it is impossible to estimate peer effects separately for females.  Moreover, the parameter 
estimates for all of the main specifications presented in the paper are certainly driven by male 
individuals.  Consequently, we do not wish to make too much of the result for females here. 
Somewhat surprisingly, race has almost no effect on the quality of peers conditional on 
age and criminal experience; if anything black individuals are exposed to marginally better peers.  
Table 10a also shows that age at exit is significantly and positively correlated with assignment to 
facilities with worse peers for six of the nine crime categories and the total crime index.  An 
Individual who is older at the time of first offense, on the other hand, is assigned to facilities with 
better peers for five of the nine crime categories and the total crime index 
 Table 10b reveals that the risk level of the facility that one is assigned to also plays a 
significant role in determining the quality of an individual’s peers.  Relative to assignment to 
minimum and low risk facilities, assignment to moderate risk, high risk, and maximum risk 
facilities significantly increases exposure to worse peers for almost all types of crimes and the 
total crime index.  This finding fits with that of Chen and Shapiro (2003), which provides 
evidence based on a regression discontinuity design that assignment of adults to higher risk 
facilities leads to an increased propensity to recidivate.  While not directly comparable, the results 
presented here imply that Chen and Shapiro’s results may be driven in part by increased exposure 
to worse peers in higher risk facilities.  We also find that facility management type does not play 
a significant role in the assignment of individuals to good or bad peers.  Taken together, the 
results presented in Table 10 imply that peers play an important in reinforcing an individual’s 
involvement in crime as he builds a more extensive criminal career, as an individual’s peers grow 
worse with assignment to higher risk-level facilities and with age and more extensive criminal 
experience. 
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VI. Summary and Conclusion  
  This paper analyzes the influence that juvenile offenders serving time in the same 
correctional facility have on each other’s subsequent criminal behavior.  The analysis is based on 
data on over 8,000 individuals serving time in 169 juvenile correctional facilities during a two-
year period in Florida; data that provide a complete record of past crimes, facility assignments, 
and arrests and adjudications in the year following release for each individual.  To control for the 
non-random assignment to facilities, we include facility fixed effects, thereby estimating peer 
effects using only within-facility variation over time.  We provide a series of exercises throughout 
the paper designed to demonstrate that the within-facility variation in peer characteristics is as 
good as randomly assigned, demonstrating that it is orthogonal to all relevant observable 
individual characteristics.  Moreover, we show that our results are robust to concerns about broad 
or localized variation over time in criminal activity throughout the state and to the possibility that 
individuals who have committed crimes together are simultaneously assigned to the same facility. 
  The results provide strong evidence of the existence of peer effects in juvenile 
correctional facilities.  In most instances, these peer effects have a reinforcing nature, whereby 
exposure to peers with a history of committing a particular crime increases the probability that an 
individual who has already committed the same type of crime  recidivates with that crime.  When 
using the entire sample, this form of a reinforcing peer effect is positive and significant for the 
cases of burglary, petty larceny, misdemeanor drug offenses, and felony sex offenses.  When 
using a sample of relatively small facilities, where we anticipate that peer characteristics are more 
precisely measured, this reinforcing peer effect is also positive and significant for robbery and 
felony drug offenses.  In contrast, we find no evidence that exposure to peers with particular 
criminal histories increases an individual’s propensity to recidivate in a crime category in which 
the individual has no prior experience; in our main specifications, the corresponding coefficient is 
never positive and significant and is actually negative and significant for robbery and petty 
larceny.    In addition, we find evidence of different types of social interactions occurring in non-
residential versus residential facilities.  Specifically, there is a strong reinforcing peer effect for 
the more serious crimes of auto theft, robbery, and felony drug offenses in non-residential 
facilities while there is such an effect for the more minor crimes of burglary, petty larceny, and 
misdemeanor drugs in residential facilities.   In addition, we find strong evidence of 
specialization—for every crime category, having a history of committing a particular crime 
increases the likelihood that an individual will recidivate with that crime.   
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  While we do not attempt to distinguish explicitly between the many potential 
mechanisms through which individuals might influence their peers, a few mechanisms do seem 
particularly capable of explaining the general pattern of our results (primarily the result that 
exposure to peers with a history of having committed a particular offense has a much stronger 
influence on those individuals who already have some experience with that offense).  One 
explanation that fits well with this pattern is that peers reinforce addictive behavior, which may 
explain part of the large reinforcing peer effect for felony drug crimes.  Another explanation is 
that individuals may experience different rates of return from participation in various types of 
legitimate or illegitimate activities; this variation in returns could be related to natural abilities, 
opportunities, human capital accumulation, or involvement in criminal networks.  In this case, 
individuals who have a history of committing a particular offense have already revealed 
themselves to have high returns and, likely, substantial human capital related to this type of 
crime.  Access to peers who can disseminate additional crime-specific knowledge or aid in the 
expansion of a criminal network may increase the individual’s returns to this type of crime, 
leading him to increase the intensity of his activity in it.  On the other hand, access to peers who 
can increase returns for another type of crime may be unhelpful, as this may not decrease the gap 
in returns between crime types enough to change an individual’s choice of type of crime.  Other 
potential social mechanisms related to stigma or to the general spread of information do not fit the 
pattern of our estimated peer effects as well. 
  The results of our analysis have several broad policy implications.  First, in the broadest 
sense, the existence of peer effects in juvenile criminal behavior suggests that any current 
reduction in crime leads, at least through the correctional system channel, to future reductions in 
crime by reducing the overall level of crime-related experience.  It is important to account for 
these dynamic benefits when considering the overall benefits of reducing crime in a given period.  
Notice that this does not imply a good course of action would be to lock up more juveniles for the 
purposes of deterring crime, as the intense exposure of juvenile offenders to one another in 
correctional facilities may, through the variety of channels discussed in this paper, increase the 
amount of criminal behavior upon release.44  However, other programs for reducing juvenile 
crime—so long as they do not increase the intensity of juvenile offenders’ exposure to one 
another or so long as they maintain a controlled social environment—might have dynamic 
benefits that greatly enhance the short-term benefits derived from the decreased criminal behavior 
of program participants. 
                                                 
44 Our paper does not explicitly provide any evidence that the intensity of peer effects is greater inside a 
correctional facility than on the outside, but one might certainly imagine that this is the case. 
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Secondly, the evidence presented in this paper overwhelmingly supports the notion that 
exposure to peers with experience in a particular crime category has its greatest effect on 
individuals who themselves already have some experience in that category.  Thus, while a policy 
of grouping offenders with others who have committed the same crimes may seem prudent to 
prevent the learning of new crimes, such a policy may inadvertently increase human capital 
precisely in those crime categories where it is likely to be of greatest use.  Finally, our results 
point to the fact that non-residential facilities, which tend to serve juveniles from nearby 
locations, may inadvertently increase subsequent criminal activity through the operation of 
particularly strong, network-related peer effects, related especially to auto theft and felony drug 
crimes.   
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Appendix 
This appendix describes the exact procedure we use to calculate the peer characteristics 
used in the analysis.  More specifically, when calculating an individual i’s peer exposure, we 
allow each observed potential peer, j, in the facility to contribute to this measure in two ways—
directly and indirectly.  A potential peer contributes directly to the peer measure if his sentence 
actually overlaps with individual i’s sentence, in which case, we weight the relevant peer 
characteristic, cj, by the number of days that individual i is exposed to the j
th peer, dij.  A potential 
peer also contributes indirectly to the peer measure in certain circumstances, leading to an 
additional weight, wij, on the relevant peer characteristic.  This weight is based on the fraction of 
sentences of the length served by the potential peer j that would not have been observed for those 
peers who overlap with the individual.  In this way, peer exposure to characteristic cj is calculated 
by the following equation 
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We estimate wij by calculating the expected number of days that individual i is exposed to 
an individual with a sentence the length of individual j’s who would have been released either 
before or after the sample period.  In doing so, we make the assumption that each facility is in a 
steady state with respect to the peers served over the relevant period and that the release date of 
each individual is randomly distributed across the sample period.  The calculation of wij is best 
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understood by considering an example.  Consider individual i released 30 days after the sample 
period begins, having served a sentence of 150 days.  Additionally, consider a peer, j, in the same 
facility with a sentence of 50 days.  This information is depicted in the following diagram, where 
the horizontal axis represents time, t, and the vertical axis represents the number of days 
individual i would be exposed to peer j if peer j is released at date t. 
 
Scenario 1:   date_release[i] <= days_in[i] - days_in[j] 
Example: date_release[i] = 30; days_in[i] = 150; days_in[j] = 50 
 
Any individuals who are released before t = 0 will be unobserved in the sample.  To calculate the 
average number of days that individual i is expected to have been exposed to individual j, we 
simply divide the area of the shaded region by 729 (the number of days in the observed sample).  
To see this more clearly, imagine, for example, that one individual with a 50-day sentence is 
released during the sample period.  In this case, the probability that such an individual was also 
released in the 120 days before the sample period is 120/729 and the average exposure of 
individual i to this individual is simply the average height of the shaded region.  Thus, the correct 
weight for individual j, wij, is simply the area of the shaded region (length * average height) 
divided by 729.   
This example depicts the correction made for just one case of pre-censoring.  For peers 
with very long sentences, pre-censoring can occur such that the unobserved region is just the 
shaded triangular portion of the diagram above.  Similarly, there are two cases of post-censoring 
that parallel those of pre-censoring.  The following are examples and diagrams that depict the 
three additional censoring scenarios.  In each scenario, wij is set equal to the area of the shaded 
region divided by 729.   
 
Scenario 2:   days_in[i] - days_in[j] < date_release[i] <= days_in[i] 
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Example: date_release[i] = 30; days_in[i] = 150; days_in[j] = 160  
 
 
 
 
Scenario 3:   days_in[j] >= 729 - date_release[i] +  days_in[i] 
Example: date_release[i] = 700; days_in[i] = 50; days_in[j] = 100 
 
 
Scenario 4:   729 - date_release[i] <= days_in[j] <= 729 - date_release[i] + days_in[i] 
Example: date_release[i] = 700; days_in[i] = 150; days_in[j] = 50  
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variable N Mean Overall Within Definition 
Recidivism      
Recidivism 8216 .67 .47 .45 1 if client recidivated within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Felony Drug 8216 .093 .29 .28 1 if client committed felony drug offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Misd. Drug 8216 .090 .29 .28 1 if client committed misd. drug offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Agg. Assault FWpn 8216 .14 .34 .34 1 if client committed aggravated assault or felony weapon offense within one 
year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Felony Sex 8216 .013 .11 .11 1 if client committed felony sex offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Auto Theft  8216 .093 .29 .28 1 if client committed auto theft offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Burglary 8216 .14 .34 .33 1 if client committed burglary offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Grand Larceny 8216 .094 .29 .29 1 if client committed grand larceny offense within one year of release, 0 
otherwise 
R_Petty Larceny 8216 .12 .32 .32 1 if client committed petty larceny offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
R_Robbery 8216 .045 .21 .20 1 if client committed robbery offense within one year of release, 0 otherwise 
      
Facility Characteristics  
     
# Individuals in Facility per day 14421 48.7 73.5 0 Calculated as number of individuals released multiplied by avg. sentence length 
in the facility, divided by 729 (total number of sample days)  
# Released 14421 196.5 240.5 0 # of individuals released from each facility 
Min Risk 14421 .15 .36 0 1 if facility to which client is assigned is designated minimum risk, 0 otherwise 
Low Risk 14421 .17 .38 0 1 if facility to which client is assigned is designated low risk, 0 otherwise 
Mod Risk 14421 .49 .50 0 1 if facility to which client is assigned is designated moderate risk, 0 otherwise 
High Risk 14421 .17 .38 0 1 if facility to which client is assigned is designated high risk, 0 otherwise 
Max Risk 14421 .010 .099 0 1 if facility to which client is assigned is designated maximum risk, 0 otherwise 
Nonprofit Mgt  14421 .54 .50 0 1 if facility to which client is assigned is managed by a private nonprofit 
organization, 0 otherwise 
For-profit Mgt  14421 .15 .36 0 1 if facility to which client is assigned is managed by a private for-profit 
organization, 0 otherwise 
County Mgt  14421 .091 .29 0 1 if facility to which client is assigned is publicly managed by the county, 0 
otherwise 
State Mgt 14421 .22 .41 0 1 if facility to which client is assigned is publicly managed by the state, 0 
otherwise 
      
Individual Characteristics  
     
Female 8216 .14 .35 .19 1 if client is female, 0 otherwise 
Black 8216 .48 .50 .48 1 if client is black, 0 otherwise 
Age First Offense 8216 12.7 2.0 1.8 Client’s age in years at first adjudicated criminal offense 
Age Exit  8216 15.7 1.0 .87 Client’s age in years at exit from facility 
Days In 8216 168.5 106.4 64.0 Number of days an individual is in facility 
      
Individual Criminal History Characteristics  
   
Felonies 8216 4.7 4.6 4.1 Number of felony charges on client’s record 
Fel Drug 8216 .13 .33 .32 1 if any felony drug charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Mis Drug 8216 .16 .37 .36 1 if any misd. drug charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Fel Sex 8216 .067 .25 .24 1 if any felony sex offense charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Mis Sex 8216 .0095 .097 .096 1 if any misd. sex offense charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
AggAss_Fwpn 8216 .37 .48 .47 1 if any aggravated assault or felony weapon offense charges on client’s record, 0 
otherwise 
Mis Weap 8216 .042 .20 .20 1 if any misd. weapon offense charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Auto Theft  8216 .26 .44 .16 1 if any auto theft charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Grlrcn 8216 .35 .48 .46 1 if any grand larceny charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Plrcn 8216 .61 .49 .48 1 if any petty larceny charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Burglary 8216 .58 .49 .47 1 if any burglary charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Robbery 8216 .13 .33 .32 1 if any robbery charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Escape 8216 .077 .27 .25 1 if any escape charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Vandalism 8216 .31 .46 .45 1 if any vandalism charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Disorder 8216 .093 .29 .29 1 if any disorderly conduct charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
Other 8216 .92 .27 .26 1 if any other charges on client’s record, 0 otherwise 
      
Individual Neighborhood Characteristics  
 
Youth Crime Rate in Zip  8216 358 260 247 Total number of juvenile referrals in client’s home zip code, FY 2000-01 
% Own Race in Zip  8216 .60 .33 .32 % of inhabitants in client’s home zip code of same racial group as client, 1990 
Per-Cap Inc Race  8216 10710 4331 4180 Median per-capita income of client’s racial group in client’s home zip code, 1990 
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Unemployment Rate  8216 .068 .028 .027 % unemployment rate in client’s home zip code, 1990 
Incarcerated in Zip  8216 109 307 301 Number of people incarcerated in client’s home zip code, 1990 
Per-Cap Income  8216 12316 3661 3533 Median per-capita income in home zip code, 1990 
      
Peer Demographic Characteristics    
 
Peer_male 8216 .86 .29 .038 Weighted average of whether or not an individual’s peers are male 
Peer_age_exit  8216 16.4 .88 .22 Weighted average of the age at exit of an individual’s peers  
Peer_age1st  8216 13.1 .81 .32 Weighted average of the age at first offense of an individual’s peers  
      
Peer Criminal History Characteristics   
 
Peer_fel 8216 4.7 2.1 .63 Weighted average of the number of felony charges of an individual’s peers  
Peer_fel_drg 8216 .16 .10 .053 Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of any felony 
drug offenses 
Peer_mis_drg 8216 .19 .11 .065 Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of any misd. 
drug offenses 
Peer_fel_sex 8216 .069 .097 .038 Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of any felony 
sex offenses 
Peer_mis_sex 8216 .010 .023 .016 Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of any misd. sex 
offenses 
Peer_aggass_fwpn 8216 .37 .14 .075 Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of any 
aggravated assault or felony weapon offenses 
Peer_mis_wpn 8216 .042 .038 .028 Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of any misd. 
weapon offenses 
Peer_auto 8216 .27 .14 .066 Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of auto theft  
Peer_glrcn 8216 .35 .13 .077 Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of grand larceny 
Peer_plrcn 8216 .61 .12 .081 Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of petty larceny 
Peer_burg 8216 .57 .16 .079 Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of burglary 
Peer_rob 8216 .13 .11 .051 Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of robbery 
Peer_vand 8216 .30 .11 .070 Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of vandalism 
Peer_dsord 8216 .090 .069 .048 Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of disorderly 
conduct 
Peer_escp 8216 .077 .093 .039 Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of escape 
Peer_other 8216 .92 .074 .048 Weighted average of whether an individual’s peers have a record of other 
offenses 
      
Peer Neighborhood Characteristics    
 
Peer_percapi 8216 10754 1988 810 Weighted average of the per-capita income in an individual’s peers’ zip codes 
Peer_percorin  8216 93 65 42 Weighted average of the number of incarcerated people in an individual’s peers’ 
zip codes 
    NOTE.—Neighborhood characteristics are constructed for Florida zip codes only.  Individuals with zip codes from other states are assigned a zero for all 
neighborhood characteristics, and a dummy variable denoting that an individual has an out-of-state zip code of residence is included in all regressions.  This 
allows us to maintain the full sample for the regressions, and it controls for the potential problem that out -of-state youths are less likely to recidivate in Florida. 
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Table 2a.  Correlations between Peer Variables and Individual Variables 
                
 Fel Sex Fel Drug Mis Drug Auto Thef Burglary Grlrcn Plrcn Robbery AggAss_Fwpn 
Peer_fel_sex .3210* .0122 -.0124 .0107 .0257* .0305* -.0187 .0291* .0245* 
Peer_fel_drg -.0046 .1779* .1306* .1320* .1418* .0915* .0665* .1400* .0864* 
Peer_mis_drg -.0237* .1319* .1638* .0448* .0876* .0445* .0577* .0492* .0044 
Peer_auto -.0092 .1103* .0491* .2369* .1450* .1265* .0348* .1893* .1268* 
Peer_burg .0208 .1071* .0672* .1318* .2527* .1530* .0899* .1555* .0892* 
Peer_glrcn .0193 .0858* .0522* .1302* .1719* .1913* .0973* .1023* .0819* 
Peer_plrcn -.0287* .0433* .0400* .0470* .1132* .1087* .1371* .0636* .0678* 
Peer_rob .0143 .1072* .0431* .1805* .1568* .0957* .0492* .2695* .1396* 
Peer_aggass_fwpn .0202 .0697* .0079 .1382* .0944* .0825* .0493* .1567* .2163* 
NOTE. — *  indicates that the correlation coefficient is significant at the 5% level or better. 
 
 
 
Table 2b.  Correlations between Fixed Effects-Transformed Peer Variables and Indivi dual 
Variables 
                
 Fel Sex Fel Drug Mis Drug Auto Thef Burglary Grlrcn Plrcn Robbery AggAss_Fwpn 
Peer_fel_sex .0231* -.0013 .0001 -.0130 .0070 .0030 .0124 -.0118 -.0026 
Peer_fel_drg .0039 -.0288* .0204 -.0214 .0064 .0120 .0229* -.0024 .0117 
Peer_mis_drg .0034 .0217* .0225* -.0207 .0078 -.0057 .0115 .0033 .0020 
Peer_auto -.0025 -.0159 -.0157 .0041 .0014 .0226* -.0120 .0074 -.0131 
Peer_burg -.0011 -.0003 .0031 -.0107 -.0014 -.0161 .0041 .0068 .0029 
Peer_glrcn -.0021 .0134 -.0002 .0141 -.0250* .0037 -.0038 -.0031 .0019 
Peer_plrcn -.0038 .0097 .0084 -.0064 .0164 -.0048 .0035 .0153 .0102 
Peer_rob -.0083 -.0049 .0018 .0208 .0099 -.0029 .0208 .0086 -.0055 
Peer_aggass_fwpn -.0126 .0102 -.0026 .0048 -.0039 .0062 .0121 -.0017 .0099 
NOTE.— All variables have undergone fixed effect transformations (that is, facility averages have been subtracted out).  * indicates that the correlation 
coefficient is significant at the 5% level or better.
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Table 3a.  Peer Effects and Specialization in the Entire Sample – Without facility fixed effects and any controls 
Dependent Variable =  R_Auto Theft  R_Burglary  
R_Grand 
Larceny 
R_Petty 
Larceny R_Robbery  
R_Felony 
Drug R_Misd. Drug 
R_Agg. 
Assault FWpn R_Felony Sex 
.028 .14** .0041 .19** .046 .47** .15** .10** -.099** Offense*Peer_offense 
0.55 3.30 0.09 3.33 0.93 5.50 2.00 2.01 3.65 
.099** .051 .040 -.035 .068** .20** .098** .059* .038** Peer_offense 
3.73 1.61 1.43 0.81 2.97 6.36 3.04 1.82 2.13 
.088** .078** .059** .043** .054** .23** .13** .096** .056** Offense (at mean) 
11.94 11.51 9.50 6.18 7.56 24.20 15.16 12.84 10.32 
Facility Fixed Effects  NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Peer Characteristics  NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Individual 
Characteristics  NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
# observations 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 
R2 .0283 .0321 .0155 .0092 .0155 .1080 .0346 .0278 .0137 
 
 
Table 3b.  Peer Effects and Specialization in the Entire Sample – With facility fixed effects but no controls 
Dependent Variable =  
R_Auto 
Theft  R_Burglary  
R_Grand 
Larceny 
R_Petty 
Larceny R_Robbery  
R_Felony 
Drug R_Misd. Drug 
R_Agg. 
Assault FWpn R_Felony Sex 
.054 .20** -.0047 .23** .13 .10 .28** .076 .26** Offense*Peer_offense 
0.53 2.35 0.06 2.62 1.23 0.65 2.39 0.80 2.10 
.038 -.071 -.018 -.095 -.066 .093 -.046 -.0047 .032 Peer_offense 
0.71 1.14 0.39 1.41 1.43 1.56 0.89 0.08 0.94 
.083** .073** .055** .041** .053** .24** .13** .095** .054** Offense (at mean) 
11.65 10.64 8.71 5.77 7.90 25.56 15.34 12.58 10.16 
Facility Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Peer Characteristics  NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Individual Characteristics  NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
# recidivate with offense  760 1116 770 954 369 762 738 1119 108 
% recidivate with offense 9.3% 13.6% 9.4% 11.6% 4.5% 9.3% 9.0% 13.6% 1.3% 
# observations 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 
R2 .0583 .0628 .0368 .0276 .0447 .1279 .0600 .0527 .0334 
    NOTE.—Each column represents a different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) while 
Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Note that the peer_offense measures are constructed such that they have a mean of zero.  The absolute values of t-
statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications are simultaneously estimated as a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). 
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Table 3c.  Peer Effects and Specialization in the Entire Sample – With facility fixed effects and controls for peer characteristics 
Dependent Variable =  
R_Auto 
Theft  R_Burglary  
R_Grand 
Larceny 
R_Petty 
Larceny R_Robbery  
R_Felony 
Drug R_Misd. Drug 
R_Agg. 
Assault FWpn R_Felony Sex 
.045 .20** -.0033 .22** .13 .11 .27** .077 .27** Offense*Peer_offense 
0.44 2.36 0.04 2.53 1.18 0.67 2.34 0.80 2.19 
.045 -.038 -.044 -.12* -.092* .070 -.035 .027 .042 Peer_offense 
0.81 0.53 0.85 1.67 1.87 1.09 0.64 0.42 1.21 
.083** .073** .055** .041** .053** .24** .13** .095** .054** Offense (at mean) 
11.57 10.68 8.70 5.74 7.81 25.52 15.33 12.58 10.17 
Facility Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Peer Characteristics  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual Characteristics  NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
# observations 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 
R2 .0602 .0651 .0395 .0295 .0469 .1307 .0620 .0543 .0362 
 
Table 3d.  Peer Effects and Specialization in the Entire Sample – With facility fixed effects and controls for both peer and individual 
characteristics 
Dependent Variable =  R_Auto Theft  R_Burglary  
R_Grand 
Larceny 
R_Petty 
Larceny R_Robbery  
R_Felony 
Drug 
R_Misd. 
Drug 
R_Agg. 
Assault FWpn 
R_Felony 
Sex 
.040 .20** -.0029 .22** .14 .059 .25** .084 .28** Offense*Peer_offense 
0.39 2.43 0.04 2.51 1.28 0.38 2.18 0.88 2.21 
.044 -.042 -.035 -.11 -.11** .068 -.036 .014 .039 Peer_offense 
0.79 0.59 0.68 1.61 2.14 1.08 0.65 0.22 1.13 
.081** .063** .044** .044** .047** .21** .12** .079** .054** Offense (at mean) 
10.26 6.98 5.63 5.67 6.51 21.16 13.33 9.47 9.84 
Facility Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Peer Characteristics  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual Characteristics  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
# recidivate with offense  760 1116 770 954 369 762 738 1119 108 
% recidivate with offense 9.3% 13.6% 9.4% 11.6% 4.5% 9.3% 9.0% 13.6% 1.3% 
# observations 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 
R2 .0739 .0810 .0542 .0394 .0656 .1619 .0708 .0770 .0389 
    NOTE.—Each column represents a different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) while 
Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Note that the peer_offense measures are constructed such that they have a mean of zero.  The absolute values of t-
statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications are simultaneously estimated as a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).  
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Table 4a.  Test of Identification Strategy for the Full Sample – Regressions of Predicted Recidivism (off of individual 
characteristics) on the Relevant Peer Measure 
Dependent Variable =  
Predicted 
Auto  
Predicted 
Burglary 
Predicted 
Grand 
Larceny 
Predicted 
Petty 
Larceny 
Predicted 
Robbery 
Predicted 
Felony Drug 
Predicted 
Misd. Drug 
Predicted 
Agg. Ass. 
Felony Wpn 
Predicted 
Felony Sex 
.19** -.060 .059 -.022 .14** .82** .28** .092 .059** Offense*Peer_offense 
4.03 1.21 1.58 0.80 5.98 4.45 4.13 1.48 2.97 
.043** .24** .065** .069** .084** .12** .086** .097** .024** Peer_offense 
2.97 8.29 4.10 3.82 11.69 4.95 4.93 3.90 3.83 
# observations 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 
F-Statistic 49.73** 159.80** 74.52** 26.31** 115.27** 71.96** 51.20** 60.50** 25.66** 
R2 .1050 .1882 .0571 .0277 .1524 .1540 .1075 .0688 .1544 
Facility Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Small Facilities NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
 
Table 4b.  Test of Identification Strategy for the Full Sample – Regressions of Predicted Recidivism (off of individual 
characteristics) on the Relevant Peer Measure 
Dependent Variable =  
Predicted 
Auto  
Predicted 
Burglary 
Predicted 
Grand 
Larceny 
Predicted 
Petty 
Larceny 
Predicted 
Robbery 
Predicted 
Felony Drug 
Predicted 
Misd. Drug 
Predicted 
Agg. Ass. 
Felony Wpn 
Predicted 
Felony Sex 
-.0070 .0060 -.027 .0054 -.12** -.082 .032 -.018 -.063 Offense*Peer_offense 
0.12 0.12 0.85 0.24 1.96 0.31 0.45 0.37 0.84 
.0086 .0010 .0021 -.0044 .036** -.025 .0090 .026 .015** Peer_offense 
0.52 0.03 0.18 0.29 3.42 0.70 0.59 1.21 2.97 
# observations 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 
F-Statistic 0.02 0.01 0.72 0.06 3.85** 0.10 .020 .14 0.70 
R2 .1729 .3109 .1408 .1361 .2143 .1351 .1892 .1601 .2257 
Facility Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Small Facilities NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
    NOTE.—Each column represents a different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) 
while Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Note that the peer_offense measures are constructed such that they have a mean of zero.  The absolute 
values of t -statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.   The dependent variable is predicted recidivism of the crime labeled at the top of each 
column. The predicted value for each crime category is calculated from a regression of recidivism with the particular crime category on the entire set of observable individual characteristics and facility fixed 
effects.  This predicted value is then regressed on just the variables presented in these tables.  
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Table 5.  Peer Effects and Specialization in Relatively Small Facilities   
Dependent Variable =  
R_Auto 
Theft R_Burglary 
R_Grand 
Larceny 
R_Petty 
Larceny R_Robbery 
R_Felony 
Drug 
R_Misd. 
Drug 
R_Agg. 
Assault  
FWpn 
R_Felony 
Sex 
.0051 .24** .071 .23** .24** .36** .24* .12 .31** Offense*Peer_offense 
0.04 2.56 0.78 2.40 2.13 2.15 1.92 1.12 2.10 
-.0044 -.078 -.049 -.13* -.080 .056 -.065 .012 .060 Peer_offense 
0.07 0.99 0.32 1.69 1.58 0.85 1.09 0.16 1.44 
.080** .067** .037** .044** .065** .19** .12** .073** .062** Offense (at mean) 
7.54 5.48 3.40 4.19 6.50 14.22 9.60 6.37 7.50 
Facility Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Peer Characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual Characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
# recidivate with offense 365 570 398 483 165 315 362 550 60 
# observations 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 
R2 .0835 .1053 .0632 .0568 .0860 .1616 .0849 .0868 .0520 
    NOTE.—Since we cannot measure facility size directly, we approximate facility size by creating an index equal to the number of individuals released from a facility multiplied by the average number of days 
individuals stay in that facility.  The sample used in the above specifications includes those individuals in facilities where the average daily population is less than 20.  This eliminates approximately half of the 
sample.  Each column represents a different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) while 
Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Note that the peer_offense measures are constructed such that they have a mean of zero.  The absolute values of t-
statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications are simultaneously estimated as a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).   
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Table 6a.  Robustness: Peer Effects in the Entire Sample with Controls for Judicial Circuit Specific Time Trends in Crime 
Dependent Variable =  R_Auto Theft  R_Burglary  
R_Grand 
Larceny 
R_Petty 
Larceny R_Robbery  
R_Felony 
Drug 
R_Misd. 
Drug 
R_Agg. 
Assault FWpn R_Felony Sex 
.075 .22** -.025 .20** .13 .040 .25** .063 .27** Offense*Peer_offense 
0.73 2.65 0.32 2.35 1.16 0.26 2.11 0.66 2.14 
.049 -.065 -.0042 -.11 -.12** .11* -.044 .028 .040 Peer_offense 
0.86 0.91 0.08 1.63 2.43 1.64 0.77 0.43 1.14 
.079** .062** .042** .043** .044** .21** .11** .077** .055** Offense (at mean) 
10.08 6.87 5.40 5.56 6.03 20.90 12.94 9.15 10.12 
# observations 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 8216 
R2 .1025 .1048 .0733 .0618 .0841 .1864 .0924 .0972 .0689 
    NOTE.— Each column represents a different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) while 
Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Note that the peer_offense measures are constructed such that they have a mean of zero.  The absolute values of t-
statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications include facility fixed effects and are simultaneously estimated as a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR).  In addition, these specifications include a detailed set of demographic and criminal history controls at both the individual and peer levels.  These specifications include eight quarter of release 
dummies, 20 judicial circuit dummies, and a full set of interactions between the two. 
 
Table 6b.  Robustness: Peer Effects in Small Facilities with Controls for Judicial  Circuit Specific Time Trends in Crime 
Dependent Variable =  
R_Auto 
Theft R_Burglary 
R_Grand 
Larceny 
R_Petty 
Larceny R_Robbery 
R_Felony 
Drug 
R_Misd. 
Drug 
R_Agg. 
Assault FWpn 
R_Felony 
Sex 
.057 .26** .092 .21** .22** .32* .24* .12 .27* Offense*Peer_offense 
0.49 2.74 1.01 2.24 1.99 1.89 1.87 1.14 1.85 
.0073 -.12 -.038 -.13* -.087* .037 -.068 .030 .051 Peer_offense 
0.12 1.48 0.63 1.70 1.66 0.54 1.12 0.41 1.18 
.080** .063** .034** .044** .064** .18** .11** .070** .061** Offense (at mean) 
7.58 5.13 3.14 4.20 6.45 13.71 9.15 6.18 7.39 
# observations 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 
R2 .1379 .1516 .0964 .0976 .1188 .2020 .1223 .1255 .1008 
    NOTE.—Since we cannot measure facility size directly, we approximate facility size by creating an index equal to the number of individuals released from a facility multiplied by the average number of days 
individuals stay in that facility.  The sample used in the above specifications includes those individuals in facilities where the average daily populat ion is less than 20.  This eliminates approximately half of the 
sample.  Each column represents a different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) while 
Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Note that the peer_offense measures are constructed such that they have a mean of zero.  The absolute values of t-
statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications include facility fixed effects and are simultaneously estimated as a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR).  In addition, these specifications include a detailed set of demographic and criminal history controls at both the individual and peer levels.  These specifications include eight quarter of release 
dummies, 20 judicial circuit dummies, and a full set of interactions between the two. 
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Table 7.  Robustness: Test for Clustering of Individuals by Five Digit Zip Codes in All Facilities and Small Facilities 
 
  Release Date  Admit Date 
  All Facilities  Small Facilities  All Facilities  Small Facilities 
  
Observations 
Mean in 5-
digit zip 
 
Observations 
Mean in 5-
digit zip  Observations 
Mean in 5-
digit zip 
 
Observations 
Mean in 5-
digit zip 
Within 7 days   7,185 0.0284  3,461 0.0317  3,553 0.0292  1,689 0.0297 
Within 14 days  7,808 0.0290  3,920 0.0312  3,938 0.0291  1,961 0.0311 
Within 21 days  8,102 0.0290  4,163 0.0310  4,096 0.0297  2,099 0.0325 
Overall  8,216 0.0273  4,266 0.0295  4,148 0.0278  2,148 0.0301 
             
    NOTE.— The value in each cell represents the proportion of individuals who have a peer released (admitted) from the same facility that is from the same zip code during the specified time period.  
 
 
  Release Date  Admit Date 
  All Facilities  Small Facilities  All Facilities  Small Facilities 
  
Observations 
5-digit 
Difference 
from 
Overall 
 
Observations 
5-digit 
Difference 
from 
Overall  Observations 
5-digit 
Difference 
from 
Overall 
 
Observations 
5-digit 
Difference 
from 
Overall 
Within 7 days  7,185 0.0022 
 3,461 0.0039  3,533 0.0027 
 1,689 0.0016 
   1.34   1.43   1.22   0.50 
Within 14 days  7,808 0.0026 
 3,920 0.0034  3,938 0.0022 
 1,961 0.0027 
   1.91   1.62   1.36   1.06 
Within 21 days  8,102 0.0022 
 4,163 0.0023  4,096 0.0023 
 2,099 0.0033 
   1.86   1.27   1.80   1.48 
             
    NOTE.— The value in each cell represents the difference between the mean presented in the corresponding cell in the above panel and the mean for the overall sample period. Note that the mean for the overall 
sample period is calculated using the sample of individuals who have at least one peer released (admitted)  within 7, 14, and 21 days, respectively. The absolute value of the p-value corresponding to each 
difference is presented in italics. 
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Table 8.  Robustness: Individuals Released during the Middle Year of the Sample  
Dependent Variable =  
R_Auto 
Theft R_Burglary 
R_Grand 
Larceny 
R_Petty 
Larceny R_Robbery 
R_Felony 
Drug 
R_Misd. 
Drug 
R_Agg. 
Assault 
FWpn 
R_Felony 
Sex 
-.031 .31** .033 .20 .31* -.28 .52** .12 .64** Offense*Peer_offense 
0.21 2.58 0.27 1.58 1.77 1.19 3.12 0.86 3.20 
-.0071 -.10 -.012 -.11 -.19** .16 -.090 -.070 .10* Peer_offense 
0.08 0.93 0.14 1.07 2.40 1.53 1.06 0.69 1.71 
.086** .067** .033** .042** .055** .22** .14** .065** .065** Offense (at mean) 
7.80 5.33 3.01 3.91 5.29 15.47 11.38 5.35 8.01 
# observations 4057 4057 4057 4057 4057 4057 4057 4057 4057 
R2 .0950 .1081 .0824 .0637 .0947 .1928 .1056 .1039 .0635 
    NOTE.—The regressions above use just those 4,057 individuals who were released between December 30, 1997 and December 30, 1998 and who were younger than 17 at the time.  Each column represents a 
different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) while Peer_offense in this specification is 
Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Note that the peer_offense measures are constructed such that they have a mean of zero.  The absolute values of t-statistics are in italics.  ** represents 
significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications include facility fixed effects and are simultaneously estimated as a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).  In addition, 
these specifications include a detailed set of demographic and criminal history controls at both the individual and peer levels.  
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Table 9a.  Peer Effects in Residential Facilities 
Dependent Variable =  R_Auto Theft  R_Burglary  
R_Grand 
Larceny 
R_Petty 
Larceny R_Robbery  
R_Felony 
Drug R_Misd. Drug 
R_Agg. 
Assault FWpn R_Felony Sex 
-.075 .30** -.0051 .25** .073 -.026 .34** .095 .23* Offense*Peer_offense 
0.66 3.20 0.06 2.61 0.60 0.15 2.66 0.92 1.77 
.074 -.13 -.0094 -.18** -.11** .086 -.091 .011 .057 Peer_offense 
1.20 1.62 0.16 2.22 2.02 1.18 1.44 0.16 1.56 
.080** .061** .042** .044** .046** .21** .12** .081** .056** Offense (at mean) 
9.37 6.13 4.93 5.20 5.79 20.03 12.79 8.89 9.71 
# observations 6992 6992 6992 6992 6992 6992 6992 6992 6992 
R2 .0731 .0776 .0509 .0394 .0641 .1676 .0705 .0798 .0426 
    NOTE.—Each column represents a different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) while 
Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Note that the peer_offense measures are constructed such that they have a mean of zero.  The absolute values of t-
statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications include facility fixed effects and are simultaneously estimated as a seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR). In addition, these specifications include a detailed set of demographic and criminal history controls at both the individual and peer levels.  Note that these specifications only include 
individuals from residential facilities.  
 
 
Table 9b.  Peer Effects in Non-Residential Facilities 
Dependent Variable =  R_Auto Theft  R_Burglary  
R_Grand 
Larceny 
R_Petty 
Larceny R_Robbery  
R_Felony 
Drug R_Misd. Drug 
R_Agg. 
Assault FWpn R_Felony Sex 
.80** -.19 -.014 .083 .44* .62* -.11 .041 .66 Offense*Peer_offens e 
3.42 1.07 0.07 0.42 1.83 1.73 0.43 0.16 1.13 
-.11 .38** -.16 .087 -.029 .035 .20 .011 -.17 Peer_offense 
0.80 2.49 1.43 0.60 0.24 0.28 1.63 0.07 1.52 
.076** .076** .052** .040** .065** .14** .090** .064** .032* Offense (at mean) 
4.02 3.71 2.65 2.17 3.87 5.21 3.75 3.16 1.70 
# observations 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 
R2 .1136 .1512 .1124 .0837 .1368 .1589 .1228 .0839 .0465 
    NOTE.—Each column represents a different specification; Offense and Peer_offense vary across specifications.  Thus, in the first column, Offense is “Auto Theft” (individuals with a history of auto theft) while 
Peer_offense in this specification is Peer_auto (exposure to peers with a history of auto theft).  Note that the peer_offense measures are constructed such that they have a mean of zero.  The absolute values of t-
statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level All specifications include facility fixed effects and are simultaneously estimated as a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR). In addition, these specifications include a detailed set of demographic and criminal history controls at both the individual and peer levels.  Note that these specifications only include 
individuals from residential facilities.  
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Table  10a.  Individual Determinants of Peer Quality   
 
R_Hat 
Auto 
R_Hat 
Burg 
R_Hat 
Grlrcn 
R_Hat 
Plrcn 
R_Hat 
Rob 
R_Hat 
Fdrg 
R_Hat 
Mdrg 
R_Hat 
Agg. Ass. 
Fwep 
R_Hat 
Fsex 
R_Hat Tot 
Crime Index 
Female 0.06563*** 0.05323*** 0.04854*** -0.01642*** -0.01750*** -0.02711*** -0.04991*** -0.04010*** 0.00169 0.00265 
 (9.54) (8.18) (7.55) (3.59) (5.74) (5.36) (9.12) (6.80) (0.90) (1.60) 
Black -0.00150 -0.00239* -0.00408** -0.00060 -0.00028 0.00193* 0.00298*** 0.00000 -0.00241* -0.00088 
 (1.37) (1.94) (2.54) (0.45) (0.29) (1.70) (2.83) (0.00) (1.68) (1.48) 
Age_exit  0.01069*** 0.00713*** 0.02050*** 0.01153*** -0.00304*** 0.00052 -0.00718*** -0.00158 0.00240*** 0.00428*** 
 (5.30) (3.79) (5.72) (5.74) (3.22) (0.33) (3.58) (1.57) (2.96) (6.02) 
Age1st 0.00022 -0.00031 -0.00008 -0.00120** -0.00122*** -0.00140*** -0.00109*** 0.00006 -0.00049* -0.00059*** 
 (0.74) (0.99) (0.19) (2.57) (4.26) (3.87) (4.24) (0.21) (1.89) (3.43) 
Felonies 0.00005 0.00035* 0.00023 0.00128*** 0.00082*** 0.00151*** 0.00064*** 0.00046** 0.00032*** 0.00059*** 
 (0.25) (1.77) (0.95) (4.68) (3.87) (5.74) (4.00) (2.61) (4.32) (6.08) 
Fel Sex -0.00604** 0.01006* 0.00386 -0.00715 0.01098*** 0.00745*** 0.00201 0.00770*** 0.01881 0.00652** 
 (2.17) (1.71) (0.62) (1.25) (2.71) (2.71) (0.54) (3.38) (1.64) (2.19) 
Mis Sex 0.00065 0.00378 0.00546 0.01331* 0.01340*** 0.00157 -0.00135 -0.00806** -0.00371 0.00237 
 (0.16) (0.93) (0.99) (1.95) (2.63) (0.34) (0.43) (2.43) (1.24) (1.02) 
Fel Drug 0.00049 -0.00202 0.00087 0.00632*** 0.00090 0.00843*** 0.00212* 0.00315** 0.00084 0.00211*** 
 (0.40) (1.30) (0.59) (3.96) (0.86) (4.01) (1.74) (2.19) (1.03) (3.15) 
Mis Drug 0.00023 -0.00360*** -0.00187 -0.00071 -0.00048 0.00041 0.00073 -0.00015 -0.00050 -0.00068 
 (0.23) (3.47) (1.39) (0.62) (0.68) (0.32) (0.77) (0.18) (0.63) (1.43) 
Fel Weap 0.00029 -0.00284** -0.00133 0.00267** 0.00166** 0.00280** 0.00304*** 0.00429*** 0.00157*** 0.00133** 
 (0.28) (2.59) (0.86) (2.00) (2.05) (2.26) (2.83) (4.85) (2.85) (2.56) 
Mis Weap -0.00099 0.00016 0.00068 -0.00032 -0.00002 -0.00120 -0.00030 0.00163 0.00109 0.00018 
 (0.54) (0.09) (0.22) (0.14) (0.01) (0.55) (0.17) (1.08) (1.11) (0.18) 
Auto 0.00107 0.00091 0.00287** 0.00130 0.00000 0.00167 -0.00062 -0.00036 -0.00101** 0.00051 
 (1.01) (0.91) (2.45) (0.97) (0.00) (1.15) (0.65) (0.39) (2.17) (1.01) 
Grlrcen -0.00199** -0.00089 -0.00173 0.00046 -0.00007 0.00163* 0.00134* 0.00173** -0.00027 -0.00002 
 (2.18) (1.04) (1.33) (0.47) (0.13) (1.73) (1.71) (2.10) (0.82) (0.05) 
Plrcen -0.00090 -0.00275*** -0.00302** 0.00278*** 0.00017 0.00042 0.00196** 0.00227*** -0.00020 0.00002 
 (0.82) (2.70) (2.29) (3.07) (0.28) (0.39) (2.01) (3.19) (0.41) (0.05) 
Burglary -0.00055 0.00319** -0.00159 0.00052 -0.00136 -0.00059 0.00052 0.00143 -0.00147 -0.00008 
 (0.53) (2.45) (1.05) (0.41) (1.63) (0.52) (0.51) (1.57) (1.18) (0.15) 
Robbery -0.00030 0.00105 -0.00143 0.00668** 0.00377* 0.00541*** 0.00136 0.00041 -0.00113 0.00151 
 (0.22) (0.65) (0.70) (2.54) (1.85) (2.62) (1.10) (0.31) (0.78) (1.53) 
Escape 0.00820*** -0.00012 0.00315 0.01251*** 0.00899*** 0.01070*** 0.00744*** -0.00529** 0.00184* 0.00481*** 
 (3.22) (0.06) (1.07) (3.88) (4.24) (4.05) (3.81) (2.18) (1.79) (3.95) 
Vandalism 0.00024 0.00003 0.00055 0.00134 0.00016 0.00008 -0.00110 0.00131* 0.00027 0.00033 
 (0.27) (0.03) (0.40) (1.12) (0.24) (0.07) (1.11) (1.76) (0.41) (0.72) 
Disorder -0.00179 -0.00270 -0.00199 -0.00179 -0.00058 0.00039 0.00075 -0.00056 -0.00110 -0.00107* 
 (1.08) (1.48) (1.02) (1.11) (0.53) (0.26) (0.49) (0.45) (0.86) (1.86) 
Other -0.00287 -0.00220 -0.00526 0.00236 0.00098 0.00057 0.00211 -0.00003 -0.00303 -0.00101 
 (1.48) (0.87) (1.59) (0.85) (0.57) (0.26) (0.92) (0.03) (0.67) (0.79) 
Constant 0.02139 0.03219 0.29576*** 0.24852*** 0.01551 -0.12292*** -0.09386*** 0.16323*** 0.15025*** 0.08412*** 
 (0.64) (1.04) (5.10) (7.66) (0.88) (4.73) (2.80) (10.32) (21.69) (8.00) 
Observations 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 
R-squared 0.59 0.44 0.47 0.35 0.40 0.33 0.51 0.47 0.14 0.27 
NOTE.—The absolute values of t -statistics are in parentheses.  The standard errors used to calculate the t -statistics are corrected for clustering within facilities.  ** 
represents significance at the 5% level and * represents significance at the 10% level.  All specifications also include a set of judicial circuit dummies.  
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Table 10b.  Facility Determinants of Peer Quality   
 
R_Hat 
Auto 
R_Hat 
Burg 
R_Hat 
Grlrcn 
R_Hat 
Plrcn 
R_Hat 
Rob 
R_Hat 
Fdrg 
R_Hat 
Mdrg 
R_Hat 
Agg. Ass. 
Fwep 
R_Hat 
Fsex 
R_Hat Tot 
Crime Index 
Low Risk -0.01858* -0.00354 -0.02584* -0.00794 0.01003** 0.00461 0.01224 0.00154 0.00082 -0.00258 
 (1.80) (0.41) (1.71) (1.16) (2.04) (0.47) (1.00) (0.23) (0.32) (1.13) 
Mod Risk -0.00946 -0.00503 -0.01733 0.00894 0.02333*** 0.02849*** 0.02712** 0.00388 0.00885*** 0.00749*** 
 (0.97) (0.57) (1.27) (1.15) (5.03) (3.01) (2.36) (0.66) (2.84) (3.22) 
High Risk -0.01461 0.00902 0.00621 0.04879*** 0.04197*** 0.06281*** 0.03345*** 0.01848** 0.02540** 0.02511*** 
 (1.22) (0.78) (0.45) (4.00) (5.91) (4.69) (2.77) (2.01) (2.11) (6.61) 
Max Risk -0.00661 0.01583* 0.00949 0.09865*** 0.06786*** 0.08200*** 0.04328*** 0.03471*** 0.01850*** 0.03822*** 
 (0.66) (1.86) (0.86) (10.58) (6.35) (6.50) (3.82) (3.46) (4.23) (13.16) 
Non-profit Mgt 0.00255 -0.00153 -0.00857 -0.01177* -0.00287 0.00273 0.00176 -0.00001 0.00266 -0.00131 
 (0.24) (0.20) (0.72) (1.67) (0.72) (0.48) (0.23) (0.00) (1.03) (0.55) 
For-profit Mgt  0.01005 -0.00729 0.00737 0.00676 -0.01054 0.00840 -0.00487 0.00326 0.00106 0.00124 
 (0.73) (0.70) (0.63) (0.71) (1.46) (0.87) (0.54) (0.25) (0.25) (0.34) 
County Mgt  -0.00129 -0.01375 0.00706 0.02122** -0.02188*** 0.01596** -0.00352 0.01819* -0.00274 0.00114 
 (0.10) (1.14) (0.52) (2.18) (4.34) (2.20) (0.40) (1.83) (0.73) (0.37) 
Constant 0.21308*** 0.15325*** 0.63740*** 0.41616*** -0.06238*** -0.15384*** -0.24394*** 0.13001*** 0.17127*** 0.14099*** 
 (15.99) (11.90) (38.85) (41.43) (10.72) (15.23) (18.01) (16.06) (45.89) (48.62) 
Observations 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 
R-squared 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.52 
NOTE.—The absolute values of t -statistics are in parentheses.  The standard errors used to calculate the t -statistics are corrected for clustering within facilities.  ** 
represents significance at the 5% level and * represents significance at  the 10% level.  All specifications also include a set of judicial circuit dummies.  Minimum Risk 
(facilities) is the omitted risk level variable; State Mgt (facilities) is the omitted management type variable.     
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Appendix Table 1.  Examples of Crimes Included in Each Crime Category  
Crime Category Included Crimes 
Auto Theft Vehicle theft (2nd degree); grand theft auto (2nd degree) 
Burglary Burglary of a dwelling structure; Possession of burglary tools; Unarmed burglary 
of a dwelling; Burglary of unoccupied dwelling 
Grand Larceny Grand larceny in the 1st degree (excluding auto theft); Grand larceny valued 
between $20,000 and $100,000 (excluding auto theft); Grand larceny valued 
between $300 and $20,000 (excluding auto theft); Grand larceny of a firearm; 3rd 
or subsequent petty larceny conviction 
Petty Larceny Shoplifting; 1st or 2nd petty larceny conviction 
Robbery Robbery with firearm or weapon; Robbery/carjacking with firearm or weapon; 
Robbery (no firearm or weapon); Robbery and residential home invasion; other 
robbery 
Felony Drug Possession; Possession with intent to sell; Use; Purchase; Distribution; 
Manufacturing – Includes a variety of drug categories and amounts 
Misdemeanor Drug Possession or distribution of less than 20 grams marijuana; Possession of narcotic 
equipment; Possession of drug paraphernalia; Possession of legend drugs without 
a prescription 
Aggravated Assault/ 
Felony Weapon 
Aggravated assault and/or battery; Carry concealed weapon; Possession of 
weapon on school property; Fire a weapon from vehicle; Bomb threat 
Misdemeanor 
Weapon 
Openly carrying prohibited weapon; Improper exhibition of a firearm 
Felony Sex Sexual assault/battery; Sexual offense against a child; Lewd and lascivious act; 
Other felony sex offenses 
Misdemeanor Sex Obscene phone call; Indecent exposure in public; prostitution 
Escape Escape from training school, secure detention, or residential program 
Vandalism Damage property or criminal mischief  
Disorderly Conduct Disturbing the peace; Disturbing a school function; Disorderly intoxication; 
Conspire to interrupt education 
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Appendix Table 2.  Peer Effects and Specialization in Relatively Small Facilities 
Dependent Variable =  
R_Auto 
Theft R_Burglary 
R_Grand 
Larceny 
R_Petty 
Larceny R_Robbery 
R_Felony 
Drug 
R_Misd. 
Drug 
R_Agg. 
Assault 
FWpn 
R_Felony 
Sex 
.0051 .24** .071 .23** .24** .36** .24* .12 .31** Offense*Peer_offense 
0.04 2.56 0.78 2.40 2.13 2.15 1.92 1.12 2.10 
-.0044 -.045 .013 .0091 -.0093 .058 .0018 .036 -.033 Peer_auto 
0.07 0.70 0.23 0.15 0.25 1.21 0.03 0.56 1.44 
-.0021 -.078 .031 -.0025 .0076 -.0039 .00075 .042 .00056 Peer_burg 
0.04 0.99 0.61 0.05 0.23 0.09 0.02 0.72 0.03 
-.067 -.029 -.049 .00098 .00056 .067 .021 .045 .019 Peer_glrcn 
1.39 0.50 0.82 0.02 0.02 1.56 0.44 0.79 0.91 
.049 -.023 .013 -.13* .011 -.0098 .033 .032 .012 Peer_plrcn 
1.10 0.43 0.27 1.69 0.35 0.25 0.74 0.61 0.62 
-.0064 .012 -.12* .026 -.080 .036 -.016 -.089 -.031 Peer_rob 
0.10 0.15 1.72 0.34 1.58 0.60 0.24 1.11 1.08 
.017 -.069 .00030 .12 -.042 .056 .0094 .070 -.0038 Peer_fel_drg 
0.24 0.82 0.00 1.44 0.87 0.85 0.13 0.83 0.13 
-.025 -.071 -.045 -.083 .082** .026 -.065 -.030 .039* Peer_mis_drg 
0.46 1.09 0.79 1.34 2.20 0.54 1.09 0.47 1.70 
.034 -.12** -.012 .0098 .025 -.023 .013 .012 .036* Peer_aggass_fwpn 
0.72 2.13 0.25 0.18 0.76 0.55 0.27 0.16 1.79 
-.051 .10 .065 -.078 .083 .089 -.015 .096 .060 Peer_fel_sex 
0.55 0.93 0.66 0.72 1.30 1.07 0.16 0.86 1.44 
-.016 -.066 -.11 -.26* .0071 -.22* -.052 .0075 .0060 Peer_mis_wpn 
0.12 0.43 0.79 1.76 0.08 1.89 0.41 0.05 0.11 
-.26 -.10 .0020 .14 .47** -.30 -.21 .14 -.12 Peer_mis_sex 
1.18 0.39 0.01 0.54 3.06 1.51 0.96 0.54 1.23 
.016 -.034 -.0069 .11* -.0028 -.022 -.074 .084 .019 Peer_vand 
0.31 0.55 0.13 1.82 0.08 0.47 1.44 1.36 0.85 
-.068 -.093 -.017 -.019 -.052 .18** .14** .0018 .017 Peer_dsord 
0.96 1.09 0.23 0.23 1.07 2.85 1.98 0.02 0.54 
.17* .034 .10 .12 .076 .065 .076 -.15 .033 Peer_escp 
1.83 0.31 1.07 1.17 1.19 0.79 0.82 1.34 0.84 
-.079 -.033 -.082 .0096 .018 .020 .053 -.018 .053* Peer_other 
1.09 0.38 1.08 0.12 0.36 0.31 0.74 0.21 1.70 
-.056 -.099 -.050 .0095 .0067 .015 .076 .016 -.0074 Peer_male 
0.58 0.86 0.49 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.80 0.13 0.18 
.013 .023 .039** .028 .0015 .0025 -.0042 -.013 .0022 Peer_age_exit 
0.73 1.08 2.13 1.36 0.12 0.16 0.24 0.63 0.29 
-7.5e-06* 5.0e-06 8.2e-06* -9.5e-08 3.0e-06 -.000011** -10e-06** 1.6e-06 1.1e-06 Peer_Percapi 
1.79 0.98 1.84 0.02 1.03 2.81 2.37 0.32 0.61 
-.00011 .0010 2.8e-06 -8.7e-06 .00012** .000081 .000011 .00013 8.3e-06 Peer_Percorin 
1.27 1.05 0.03 0.09 2.16 1.08 0.14 1.31 0.23 
.014 -.0077 .00035 -.0054 -.012 -.010 -.013 .017 .0042 Peer_age1st  
1.13 0.52 0.03 0.38 1.43 0.94 1.07 1.16 0.79 
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Appendix Table 2 (Continued)   
Dependent Variable = 
Recidivate with: 
R_Auto 
Theft R_Burglary 
R_Grand 
Larceny 
R_Petty 
Larceny R_Robbery 
R_Felony 
Drug 
R_Misd. 
Drug 
R_Agg. Assault 
FWpn 
R_Felony 
Sex 
.080** .0086 .0052 .000099 .029** .018* .030** .012 .0053 Auto theft  
7.54 0.68 0.46 0.01 3.98 1.93 2.86 0.98 1.17 
.0078 .067** .023** .013 -.00072 .0075 -.0083 -.025** .0026 Burglary 
0.76 5.48 2.12 1.15 0.10 0.82 0.82 2.02 0.60 
.0049 .034** .037** .011 .0035 -.0045 .0011 .0036 .0064 Grlrcn 
0.48 2.77 3.40 0.90 0.49 0.49 0.11 0.30 1.45 
.017* .018* .029** .044** .016** -.012 .015* .00069 -.0021 Plrcn 
1.83 1.67 3.05 4.19 2.58 1.79 1.66 0.06 0.55 
-.0014 -.022 -.033** -.0051 .065** .023* .0050 .031* -.0038 Robbery 
0.09 1.28 2.19 0.31 6.50 1.82 0.35 1.80 0.62 
-.027* -.060** -.039** -.014 .0014 .19** .025* .024 .0042 Fel drug 
1.87 3.48 2.60 0.83 0.15 14.22 1.77 1.42 0.69 
-.013 -.026* -.018 -.032** -.0045 .022** .12** .0073 -.0018 Mis drug 
1.08 1.79 1.46 2.31 0.55 2.02 9.60 0.51 0.35 
.0019 .0042 .0037 .0033 .0041 -.00025 -.0060 .073** -.0041 AggAss_Fwpn 
0.20 0.37 0.37 0.30 0.62 0.03 0.64 6.37 0.10 
-.0079 -.016 -.038* .014 -.0059 -.045** -.037** .011 .062** Fel sex 
0.41 0.71 1.88 0.66 0.45 2.66 1.97 0.47 7.50 
.022 -.010 -.0060 -.032 -.0043 .0063 -.0060 -.056** -.0023 Mis weap 
1.00 0.39 0.27 1.29 0.29 0.33 0.28 2.17 0.25 
.046 .12** .081* .11** .069** -.017 -.013 -.027 -.026 Mis sex 
1.06 2.23 1.76 2.25 2.29 0.44 0.29 0.52 1.41 
.048** -.00059 .0021 -.0082 -.0026 -.0016 -.00083 .042** -.0023 Escape 
2.71 0.03 0.11 0.40 0.21 0.10 0.05 1.98 0.31 
-.012 .0087 .023** .021* .0024 -.023** -.018* .012 -.0082* Vandalism 
1.23 0.73 2.23 1.88 0.36 2.58 1.83 1.06 1.95 
-.0086 -.012 .0035 .011 .011 .0027 -.0023 .012 -.0014 Disorder 
0.58 0.67 0.22 0.66 1.08 0.20 0.15 0.66 0.22 
.024 .010 .017 .021 .0055 .020 .0083 .054** -.00086 Other 
1.57 0.57 1.07 1.19 0.53 1.47 0.55 2.97 0.13 
-.041* -.061** -.016 -.0087 -.0067 -.041* -.050** -.034 -.019* Female 
 1.75 2.16 0.64 0.32 0.41 1.93 2.14 1.20 1.87 
.047** .025 .014 .018 .035** .075** .016 .086** .00081 Black  
3.10 1.35 0.89 1.01 3.33 5.47 1.03 4.70 0.12 
-.011** -.0062 -.0039 -.023** -.0049 .010** .0027 -.014** -.0031 Age Exit  
 2.10 0.98 0.71 3.77 1.34 2.20 0.51 2.29 1.37 
.0010 -.0022 -.0020 .0026 -.0020 -.0042* -.0057** -.0056 .00026 Age First Offense 
0.35 0.65 0.65 0.78 1.01 1.65 1.99 1.63 0.21 
.000050 .000028 .000036 .000015 -.000011 .000019 -.000047 -.000074 .000028 Days In 
0.67 0.31 0.46 0.17 0.21 0.29 0.64 0.83 0.89 
.0022* .0045** .00069 .0015 .00035 .000030 .00045 .00046 .00021 Felonies 
1.64 2.77 0.48 0.97 0.37 0.02 0.33 0.28 0.36 
.0025 -.00061 -.0047** -.0041* .0031** .0025 -.00037 .0034 -.00062 Youth Crime Rate in Zip  
1.27 0.26 2.27 1.83 2.28 1.44 0.19 1.43 0.73 
.0093 .050* .019 -.0023 .023 .0014 -.015 .047* .0064 % Own Race in Zip  
0.42 1.85 0.79 0.09 1.49 0.07 0.69 1.77 0.67 
.0018 -.0011 .0027 -.00060 .000098 -.00049 .00033 -.00047 -.00071 Per-Cap Inc Race   
1.06 0.51 1.48 0.30 0.08 0.32 0.19 0.23 0.96 
-.078 -.32 .25 -.034 .028 .051 .44** -.37 -.13 Unemployment Rate  
0.36 1.24 1.11 0.14 0.19 0.27 2.02 1.42 1.42 
.00053 .00075 .0014 .0014 .0028** -.0021 -.0021 .0050** .00079 Incarcerated in Zip  
0.35 0.41 0.88 0.82 2.71 1.58 1.40 2.78 1.23 
# who recidivate with offense:  365 570 398 483 165 315 362 550 60 
# observations 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 4266 
R2 .0835 .1053 .0632 .0568 .0860 .1616 .0849 .0868 .0520 
    NOTE.—The absolute values of t -statistics are in italics.  ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents significance at 10% level.  All specifications include facility fixed effects.   
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Appendix Table 3.  Determinants of Sentence Length 
Dependent Variable = Days In    
-1.1  Past Robbery 25.6** Female 
0.34   7.60 
3.9*  Past Escape 46.0** Black 
1.81   10.45 
20.4**  Past Vandalism 1.2 Age Exit  
25.29   0.49 
-9.5**  Past Disorder .66 Age First Offense 
16.00   0.18 
133.8**  Past Agg. Assault FWpn 6.5** Last Felony Sex 
17.61   2.76 
-5.4  Past Misd. Weapon 6.0 Last Misd. Sex 
0.24   1.17 
-3.9  Past Other -4.1 Last Felony Drug 
0.82   0.98 
-17.5**  Constant 181.9** Last Misd. Drug 
3.58   185.11 
16.0**    Last Auto Theft  
3.81    
24.0**  # observations 14127 Last Burglary 
6.94  R2 .1212 
2.3    Last Grand Larceny 
0.59    
-11.0**    Last Petty Larceny 
2.92    
47.5**    Last Robbery 
8.29    
31.7**    Last Escape 
5.28    
5.6    Last Vandalism 
1.14    
-18.0*    Last Disorder 
1.95    
33.3**    Last Agg. Assault / FWpn 
9.12    
-3.7    Last Misd. Weapon 
0.28    
2.4    Last Other 
0.55    
41.9**    Past Felony Sex 
9.07    
14.9    Past Misd. Sex 
1.30    
-5.4*    Past Felony Drug 
1.66    
-15.2**    Past Misd. Drug 
5.44    
12.6**    Past Auto Theft  
5.08    
5.0**    Past Burglary 
2.06    
8.6**    Past Grand Larceny 
3.50    
-2.7    Past Petty Larceny 
1.20    
NOTE.—The absolute values of t -statistics are in italics.   ** represents significance at 5% level and * represents 
significance at 10% level.  All variables are constructed such that they have mean zero.  This regression uses the 
entire sample of individuals released from these 169 facilities.  
 
 
 
 
